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    Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences

    Volume 39, Issue 3

    241 -- 262János Aczél, Attila Gilányi, Gyula Maksa, Anthony A. J. Marley. Consistent aggregation of simply scalable families of choice probabilities
    263 -- 275J. Abdou. Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
    277 -- 301Hans van der Stel. Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
    303 -- 322Matthias G. Raith. Fair-negotiation procedures
    323 -- 348Stephen J. Willson. Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games
    349 -- 365Haruo Imai, Hannu Salonen. The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems

    Volume 39, Issue 2

    109 -- 118Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander, Lars-Erik Öller. Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness
    119 -- 132Marilda Sotomayor. Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
    133 -- 174Norman Schofield, Robert Parks. Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining
    175 -- 194Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich. Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
    195 -- 206Yasuhito Tanaka. A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game
    207 -- 234Kin Chung Lo. Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of ε-contaminated beliefs
    235 -- 240John A. Weymark. A generalization of Moulin's Pareto extension theorem

    Volume 39, Issue 1

    1 -- 12Akihiko Matsui. Expected utility and case-based reasoning
    13 -- 20William Stanford. On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games
    21 -- 34Burkhard Drees, Bernhard Eckwert. Price volatility and risk with non-separability of preferences
    35 -- 53Gilbert Laffond, Jean Lainé. Representation in majority tournaments
    55 -- 70Marco Slikker, Bhaskar Dutta, Anne van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs. Potential maximizers and network formation
    71 -- 79Luis C. Corchón, Miguel González-Maestre. On the competitive effects of divisionalization
    81 -- 107Lev A. Sholomov. Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions
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