Journal: SIGecom Exchanges

Volume 13, Issue 2

4 -- 20Tim Roughgarden. Approximately optimal mechanism design: motivation, examples, and lessons learned
21 -- 25Jacob D. Abernethy, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sindhu Kutty. On risk measures, market making, and exponential families
26 -- 30Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Julián Mestre. Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship
31 -- 35Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg. A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
36 -- 40Umang Bhaskar, Katrina Ligett. Network improvement for equilibrium routing
41 -- 46Jonathan R. Goldman, Ariel D. Procaccia. Spliddit: unleashing fair division algorithms
47 -- 52Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri. The cost of annoying ads

Volume 13, Issue 1

1 -- 0Ariel D. Procaccia. Editor's introduction
2 -- 4Vincent Conitzer, David Easley. Notes from the EC'14 program chairs
5 -- 49Shuchi Chawla, Balasubramanian Sivan. Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
50 -- 57Tayfun Sönmez. Cadet-branch matching
58 -- 63Jonatha Anselmi, Danilo Ardagna, John C. S. Lui, Adam Wierman, Yunjian Xu, Zichao Yang. The economics of the cloud: price competition and congestion
64 -- 67Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken. Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching
68 -- 71Ruggiero Cavallo. Incentive compatible allocation without money
72 -- 76Denis Nekipelov. Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design
77 -- 81Arthur Carvalho, Stanko Dimitrov, Kate Larson. The output-agreement method induces honest behavior in the presence of social projection