Journal: SIGecom Exchanges

Volume 14, Issue 2

2 -- 15Sam Ganzfried. Reflections on the first man vs. machine no-limit Texas hold 'em competition
16 -- 21Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers, Simon Mackenzie, Toby Walsh. Two desirable fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
22 -- 25Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Éva Tardos. Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax-and-round
26 -- 34Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Siddharth Suri, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. Incentivizing high quality crowdwork
35 -- 40Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Why prices need algorithms
41 -- 43Aviad Rubinstein. The complexity of simplicity in mechanism design

Volume 14, Issue 1

2 -- 40Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline. SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016
41 -- 75Constantinos Daskalakis. Multi-item auctions defying intuition?
76 -- 79Siddharth Barman, Katrina Ligett. Finding any nontrivial coarse correlated equilibrium is hard
80 -- 83Christopher P. Chambers, Nicolas S. Lambert. Introduction to dynamic belief elicitation
84 -- 88Richard Cole 0001, Vasilis Gkatzelis. Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items
89 -- 94David Easley, Arpita Ghosh. Behavioral mechanism design: optimal crowdsourcing contracts and prospect theory
95 -- 100Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Stefano Moretti, Ramasuri Narayanam, Oskar Skibski, Piotr L. Szczepanski, Michael Wooldridge. A new approach to measure social capital using game-theoretic techniques
101 -- 104Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman, Zhiwei Steven Wu. Watch and learn: optimizing from revealed preferences feedback
105 -- 108Vasilis Syrgkanis. Algorithmic game theory and econometrics