Journal: Synthese

Volume 167, Issue 3

433 -- 438Kenneth Aizawa. Editor s introduction
439 -- 456Lawrence Shapiro. Making sense of mirror neurons
457 -- 472Thomas W. Polger. Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization
473 -- 492Robert C. Richardson. Multiple realization and methodological pluralism
493 -- 510Ken Aizawa. Neuroscience and multiple realization: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale
511 -- 539Jacqueline A. Sullivan. The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and non-reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience

Volume 167, Issue 2

203 -- 205Luciano Floridi, Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson. Introduction
207 -- 230Samson Abramsky, Jouko Väänänen. From IF to BI
231 -- 249Patrick Allo. Reasoning about data and information
251 -- 270Johan van Benthem. The information in intuitionistic logic
271 -- 315Marcello D Agostino, Luciano Floridi. The enduring scandal of deduction
317 -- 325Luciano Floridi. Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts
327 -- 341Mark Jago. Logical information and epistemic space
343 -- 362Edwin D. Mares. General information in relevant logic
363 -- 389Giuseppe Primiero. An epistemic logic for becoming informed
391 -- 408Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh. Ockham s razor and reasoning about information flow
409 -- 431Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson. A positive information logic for inferential information

Volume 167, Issue 1

1 -- 32Tomasz Placek, Leszek Wronski. On infinite EPR-like correlations
33 -- 65Katherine Dunlop. Why Euclid s geometry brooked no doubt: J. H. Lambert on certainty and the existence of models
81 -- 92Rachael Briggs. The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance
93 -- 104Peter Verdée. Adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are P:::1:::::1::/Pi^1_1 -complex
105 -- 123Mark Textor. A repair of Frege s theory of thoughts
125 -- 143Jonathan Weisberg. Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
145 -- 161Colin Johnston. Tractarian objects and logical categories
163 -- 182Matthew William McKeon. A plea for logical objects
183 -- 201Robert Kowalenko. How (not) to think about idealisation and ::::ceteris paribus:::: -laws