An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit - researchr publication related

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Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme. An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. Mathematical Social Sciences, 54(2):152-175, 2007. [doi]

The following publications are possibly variants of this publication:

Stability and voting by committees with exitDolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme. scw, 23(2):229-247, 2004. [doi]

On Exiting After VotingDolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme. ijgt, 34(1):33-54, 2006. [doi]

Voting by committees under constraintsSalvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme. jet, 122(2):185-205, 2005. [doi]

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