Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

Dan Bernhardt, Tingjun Liu, Takeharu Sogo. Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs. J. Economic Theory, 188:105041, 2020. [doi]

@article{BernhardtLS20,
  title = {Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs},
  author = {Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu and Takeharu Sogo},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2020.105041},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105041},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/BernhardtLS20},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {J. Economic Theory},
  volume = {188},
  pages = {105041},
}