Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents

Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. In Péter Biró, Jason Hartline, Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel D. Procaccia, editors, EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020. pages 193-256, ACM, 2020. [doi]

Authors

Nikhil R. Devanur

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Kira Goldner

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Raghuvansh R. Saxena

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Ariel Schvartzman

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S. Matthew Weinberg

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