Abstract is missing.
- EFX Exists for Three AgentsBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn. 1-19 [doi]
- Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource AllocationRupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah 0001, Rohit Vaish. 21-22 [doi]
- One Dollar Each Eliminates EnvyJohannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta. 23-39 [doi]
- Data and IncentivesAnnie Liang, Erik Madsen. 41-42 [doi]
- Judged in Hindsight: Regulatory Incentives in Approving InnovationsSuraj Malladi. 43 [doi]
- Sequential Fundraising and Social InsuranceAmir Ban, Moran Koren. 45-46 [doi]
- The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto GameEnric Boix-Adserà, Benjamin L. Edelman, Siddhartha Jayanti. 47-48 [doi]
- Escaping Saddle Points in Constant Dimensional Spaces: An Agent-based Modeling PerspectiveGrant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu. 49-67 [doi]
- A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means PayoffJakub Dargaj, Jakob Grue Simonsen. 69-70 [doi]
- Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor MarketNikhil Garg, Ramesh Johari. 71 [doi]
- The Effects of Influencer Advertising Disclosure Regulations: Evidence From InstagramDaniel Ershov, Matthew Mitchell. 73-74 [doi]
- The Engagement-Diversity Connection: Evidence from a Field Experiment on SpotifyDavid Holtz, Ben Carterette, Praveen Chandar, Zahra Nazari, Henriette Cramer, Sinan Aral. 75-76 [doi]
- Strategic Formation and Reliability of Supply Chain NetworksVictor Amelkin, Rakesh Vohra. 77-78 [doi]
- Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic RiskSteffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken. 79 [doi]
- Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing GamesGeorge Christodoulou 0001, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa. 81-107 [doi]
- Allocation with Correlated Information: Too Good to be TrueDeniz Kattwinkel. 109-110 [doi]
- Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for ForestsYakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz. 111-131 [doi]
- Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex SpacePingzhong Tang, Dingli Yu, Shengyu Zhao. 133-157 [doi]
- Prophet Inequalities with Linear Correlations and AugmentationsNicole Immorlica, Sahil Singla 0001, Bo Waggoner. 159-185 [doi]
- On Optimal Ordering in the Optimal Stopping ProblemShipra Agrawal 0001, Jay Sethuraman, Xingyu Zhang. 187-188 [doi]
- The Secretary Recommendation ProblemNiklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky. 189 [doi]
- Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand BuyerMoshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 191 [doi]
- Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded AgentsNikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. 193-256 [doi]
- More Revenue from Two Samples via Factor Revealing SDPsConstantinos Daskalakis, Manolis Zampetakis. 257-272 [doi]
- Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating SystemsAndré Stenzel, Christoph Wolf, Peter Schmidt. 273-274 [doi]
- The Value of Observability in Dynamic PricingJosé R. Correa, Dana Pizarro, Gustavo J. Vulcano. 275-290 [doi]
- Loot Box Pricing and DesignNingyuan Chen, Adam N. Elmachtoub, Michael L. Hamilton, Xiao Lei. 291-292 [doi]
- Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of MarketplacesArash Asadpour, Ilan Lobel, Garrett J. van Ryzin. 293 [doi]
- Balancing Agent Retention and Waiting Time in Service PlatformsMarcelo Olivares, Andrés Musalem, Daniel Yung. 295-313 [doi]
- Online Policies for Efficient Volunteer CrowdsourcingVahideh H. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz. 315-316 [doi]
- Queue Lengths as Constantly Adapting Prices: Allocative Efficiency Under Random DynamicsItai Ashlagi, Jacob D. Leshno, Pengyu Qian, Amin Saberi. 317-318 [doi]
- Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing SystemsJason Gaitonde, Éva Tardos. 319-347 [doi]
- Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based PersuasionJerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Vahideh Manshadi. 349-350 [doi]
- The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income EffectsElizabeth Baldwin, Omer Edhan, Ravi Jagadeesan, Paul Klemperer, Alexander Teytelboym. 351 [doi]
- To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical CompactnessYannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers, Ran I. Shorrer. 353 [doi]
- A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution ConceptsTushant Jha, Yair Zick. 355-377 [doi]
- An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin SharesJugal Garg, Setareh Taki. 379-380 [doi]
- Consensus-Halving: Does It Ever Get Easier?Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender, Katerina Sotiraki, Manolis Zampetakis. 381-399 [doi]
- Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood RatiosSiddharth Barman, Nidhi Rathi. 401-437 [doi]
- Pandora's Box Problem with Order ConstraintsShant Boodaghians, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi. 439-458 [doi]
- Product Ranking on Online PlatformsMahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh Manshadi, Vahab S. Mirrokni. 459 [doi]
- Does Quality Improve with Customer Voice? Evidence from the Hotel IndustryUttara Ananthakrishnan, Davide Proserpio, Siddhartha Sharma. 461 [doi]
- Matching Algorithms for Blood DonationDuncan C. McElfresh, Christian Kroer, Sergey Pupyrev, Eric Sodomka, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Zack Chauvin, Neil Dexter, John P. Dickerson. 463-464 [doi]
- Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without MoneyMohammad Akbarpour, Julien Combe, Yinghua He, Victor Hiller, Robert Shimer, Olivier Tercieux. 465-466 [doi]
- Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School MatchingAlex Rees-Jones, Ran I. Shorrer, Chloe J. Tergiman. 467-468 [doi]
- Contagion in GraphonsSelman Erol, Francesca Parise, Alexander Teytelboym. 469 [doi]
- Adversarial Perturbations of Opinion Dynamics in NetworksJason Gaitonde, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos. 471-472 [doi]
- An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential LearningKrishna Dasaratha, Kevin He. 473 [doi]
- Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many MechanismsShuchi Chawla 0001, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos. 475-476 [doi]
- On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial BuyerNatalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg. 477-497 [doi]
- A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial MarketsTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler. 499-500 [doi]
- Driver Surge PricingNikhil Garg, Hamid Nazerzadeh. 501 [doi]
- Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror BackpressureYash Kanoria, Pengyu Qian. 503 [doi]
- Spatial Distribution of Supply and the Role of Market Thickness: Theory and Evidence from RidesharingSoheil Ghili, Vineet Kumar. 505-506 [doi]
- Ordered Search with Boundedly Rational ConsumersMauro Papi. 507-508 [doi]
- Finite State Machines Play Extensive-Form GamesJakub Cerný, Branislav Bosanský, Bo An 0001. 509-533 [doi]
- A Formal Separation Between Strategic and Nonstrategic BehaviorJames R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 535-536 [doi]
- Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized PricingS. Nageeb Ali, Greg Lewis, Shoshana Vasserman. 537-538 [doi]
- Dynamic Privacy ChoicesShota Ichihashi. 539-540 [doi]
- Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market ImpactEmily Diana, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth 0001, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani. 541-583 [doi]
- Two-sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance ProceduresSimon Mauras. 585-597 [doi]
- The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and ErrorEhsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, David Kempe 0001. 599 [doi]
- Efficient Matchmaking in Assignment Games with Application to Online PlatformsPeng Shi. 601-602 [doi]
- Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation StudyNeil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal. 603-604 [doi]
- Information Choice in AuctionsNina Bobkova. 605 [doi]
- Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary MechanismsSantiago R. Balseiro, Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian, Vahab S. Mirrokni. 607-608 [doi]
- Vertically Disintegrated PlatformsChristoph Aymanns, Mathias Dewatripont, Tarik Roukny. 609 [doi]
- An Economic Analysis of Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms in Proof-of-Work Blockchain SystemsShunya Noda, Kyohei Okumura, Yoshinori Hashimoto. 611 [doi]
- Continuous Credit Networks and Layer 2 Blockchains: Monotonicity and SamplingAshish Goel, Geoffrey Ramseyer. 613-635 [doi]
- Convex Optimization for Bundle Size Pricing ProblemXiaobo Li, Hailong Sun 0005, Chung-Piaw Teo. 637-638 [doi]
- Optimizing Offer Sets in Sub-Linear TimeVivek F. Farias, Andrew A. Li, Deeksha Sinha. 639-640 [doi]
- Optimal Persuasion via Bi-PoolingItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita. 641 [doi]
- Feasible Joint Posterior BeliefsItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz. 643 [doi]
- Learning through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate BiasMatthew O. Jackson, Suraj Malladi, David McAdams. 645 [doi]
- Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data DisclosureNicole Immorlica, Jieming Mao, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 647-648 [doi]
- On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit VarianceVitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Krishna P. Gummadi, Patrick Loiseau. 649-675 [doi]
- Fair Prediction with Endogenous BehaviorChristopher Jung, Sampath Kannan, Changhwa Lee, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth 0001, Rakesh Vohra. 677-678 [doi]
- Biased Programmers? Or Biased Data? A Field Experiment in Operationalizing AI EthicsBo Cowgill, Fabrizio Dell'Acqua, Samuel Deng, Daniel Hsu 0001, Nakul Verma, Augustin Chaintreau. 679-681 [doi]
- Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic CommitmentsMatheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg. 683-712 [doi]
- Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal AuctionsConstantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy. 713 [doi]
- Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via RobustnessJohannes Brustle, Yang Cai 0001, Constantinos Daskalakis. 715-761 [doi]
- One for All, All for One - Von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and ParetoMehmet S. Ismail. 763-764 [doi]
- The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large EconomiesSiddharth Barman, Federico Echenique. 765-766 [doi]
- On Sustainable EquilibriaSrihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl. 767-768 [doi]
- Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival ModelsTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang. 769-787 [doi]
- Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited TimeAli Aouad, Ömer Saritaç. 789-790 [doi]
- Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards: Optimal Competitive Ratio via Path Based FormulationVineet Goyal, Rajan Udwani. 791 [doi]
- Proportionality and the Limits of WelfarismDominik Peters, Piotr Skowron. 793-794 [doi]
- Optimal Communication-Distortion Tradeoff in VotingDebmalya Mandal, Nisarg Shah 0001, David P. Woodruff. 795-813 [doi]
- Meddling Metrics: the Effects of Measuring and Constraining Partisan Gerrymandering on Voter IncentivesBrian Brubach, Aravind Srinivasan, Shawn Zhao. 815-833 [doi]
- Machine Learning Instrument Variables for Causal InferenceAmandeep Singh, Kartik Hosanagar, Amit Gandhi. 835-836 [doi]
- Variance-Weighted Estimators to Improve Sensitivity in Online ExperimentsKevin Liou, Sean J. Taylor. 837-850 [doi]
- Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of BiasRamesh Johari, Hannah Li, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 851 [doi]
- Surrogate Scoring RulesYang Liu, Juntao Wang, Yiling Chen. 853-871 [doi]
- Small Steps to Accuracy: Incremental Belief Updaters Are Better ForecastersPavel Atanasov, Jens Witkowski, Lyle Ungar, Barbara A. Mellers, Philip Tetlock. 873-874 [doi]
- Prizes on Crowdsourcing Platforms: An Equilibrium Analysis of Competing ContestsKonstantinos I. Stouras, Sanjiv Erat, Kenneth C. Lichtendahl. 875-876 [doi]
- Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic MarketsPanayotis Mertikopoulos, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski. 877-878 [doi]
- Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite MatchingHanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer. 879-910 [doi]
- Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair DivisionDavid Zeng, Alexandros Psomas. 911-912 [doi]