Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov. Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games. J. Economic Theory, 148(2):743-777, 2013. [doi]
@article{FriedmanO13,
title = {Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games},
author = {Daniel Friedman and Daniel N. Ostrov},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.004},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.004},
researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/FriedmanO13},
cites = {0},
citedby = {0},
journal = {J. Economic Theory},
volume = {148},
number = {2},
pages = {743-777},
}