Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

Hervé Moulin. Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(2):193-216, 2010. [doi]

@article{Moulin10-0,
  title = {Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms},
  author = {Hervé Moulin},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Moulin10-0},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {34},
  number = {2},
  pages = {193-216},
}