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Hervé Moulin. Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms. Social Choice and Welfare, 34(2):193-216, 2010. [doi]
Possibly Related PublicationsThe following publications are possibly variants of this publication: Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanismsHervé Moulin. sigecom, 7(1):37-42, 2007. [doi] Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objectsHervé Moulin. jet, 144(1):96-119, 2009. [doi]
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