The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters

Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe, Roman Zorn. The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters. In Henning Fernau, editor, Computer Science - Theory and Applications - 15th International Computer Science Symposium in Russia, CSR 2020, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 29 - July 3, 2020, Proceedings. Volume 12159 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 314-327, Springer, 2020. [doi]

Authors

Marc Neveling

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Jörg Rothe

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Roman Zorn

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