The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters

Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe, Roman Zorn. The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters. In Henning Fernau, editor, Computer Science - Theory and Applications - 15th International Computer Science Symposium in Russia, CSR 2020, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 29 - July 3, 2020, Proceedings. Volume 12159 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 314-327, Springer, 2020. [doi]

@inproceedings{NevelingRZ20,
  title = {The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters},
  author = {Marc Neveling and Jörg Rothe and Roman Zorn},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-50026-9_23},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50026-9_23},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/NevelingRZ20},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {314-327},
  booktitle = {Computer Science - Theory and Applications - 15th International Computer Science Symposium in Russia, CSR 2020, Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 29 - July 3, 2020, Proceedings},
  editor = {Henning Fernau},
  volume = {12159},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-030-50026-9},
}