Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, Ilya Segal. Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study. In Péter Biró, Jason Hartline, Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel D. Procaccia, editors, EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020. pages 603-604, ACM, 2020. [doi]

Authors

Neil Newman

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Kevin Leyton-Brown

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Paul Milgrom

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Ilya Segal

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