Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations

D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari. Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. In Yang Cai 0001, Adrian Vetta, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December 11-14, 2016, Proceedings. Volume 10123 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 174-187, Springer, 2016. [doi]

Authors

D. Thirumulanathan

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Rajesh Sundaresan

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Y. Narahari

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