Abstract is missing.
- Computing Equilibria with Partial CommitmentVincent Conitzer. 1-14 [doi]
- Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate EquilibriaArtur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzinski, Rahul Savani. 15-28 [doi]
- Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash EquilibriaArgyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani. 29-43 [doi]
- Multilinear GamesHau Chan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ruta Mehta. 44-58 [doi]
- Power-Law Distributions in a Two-Sided Market and Net NeutralityXiaotie Deng, Zhe Feng, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 59-72 [doi]
- On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse CustomersDarrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier. 73-86 [doi]
- Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative PaymentsWeina Wang, Lei Ying, Junshan Zhang. 87-101 [doi]
- Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports AuctionsAris Anagnostopoulos, Ruggiero Cavallo, Stefano Leonardi, Maxim Sviridenko. 102-115 [doi]
- Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial AuctionsRad Niazadeh, Christopher A. Wilkens. 116-130 [doi]
- Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item AuctionsMichal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan. 131-144 [doi]
- Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large MarketsElliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar. 145-159 [doi]
- A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive BiddersKira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin. 160-173 [doi]
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed ValuationsD. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari. 174-187 [doi]
- Anonymous Auctions Maximizing RevenueChristos Tzamos, Christopher A. Wilkens. 188-206 [doi]
- Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with BudgetsRiccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang. 207-220 [doi]
- Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing PreferencesDimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot. 221-235 [doi]
- Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial DictatorshipIoannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Zihan Tan. 236-250 [doi]
- Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling FocalYuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett, Grant Schoenebeck. 251-264 [doi]
- Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal WorldElliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar. 265-278 [doi]
- Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism DesignGilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth, Pierre-Yves Strub. 279-293 [doi]
- Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with AdmissionMartin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Bojana Kodric. 294-308 [doi]
- Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational ApproachSusanne Albers, Dennis Kraft. 309-323 [doi]
- FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular FunctionsPiotr Skowron. 324-338 [doi]
- Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling ProblemsTobias Brunsch, Michael Etscheid, Heiko Röglin. 339-353 [doi]
- On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast GamesRupert Freeman, Samuel Haney, Debmalya Panigrahi. 354-368 [doi]
- Efficiency and Budget BalanceSwaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm. 369-383 [doi]
- The Core of the Participatory Budgeting ProblemBrandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala. 384-399 [doi]
- Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral TradingLiad Blumrosen, Yehonatan Mizrahi. 400-413 [doi]
- Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism DesignGeorgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis. 414-428 [doi]
- Strategic Network Formation with Attack and ImmunizationSanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna, Jamie Morgenstern. 429-443 [doi]
- Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social InfluencesVittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli. 444-458 [doi]
- Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree DistributionGrant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu. 459-472 [doi]
- The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat RedistributionItai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo, Jay Sethuraman. 475 [doi]
- Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated SettingsArtur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer. 476-477 [doi]
- Multi-unit Facility Location GamesOmer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz. 478-479 [doi]