Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable

Jun Zhang. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable. J. Economic Theory, 180:167-177, 2019. [doi]

@article{Zhang19-22,
  title = {Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable},
  author = {Jun Zhang},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.005},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.005},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Zhang19-22},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {J. Economic Theory},
  volume = {180},
  pages = {167-177},
}