Abstract is missing.
- Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference NetworksAbu Mohammad Hammad Ali, Howard J. Hamilton, Elizabeth Rayner, Boting Yang, Sandra Zilles. 3-18 [doi]
- Measuring Nearly Single-Peakedness of an Electorate: Some New InsightsBruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová. 19-34 [doi]
- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate ModelArnaud Grivet Sébert, Nicolas Maudet, Patrice Perny, Paolo Viappiani. 35-50 [doi]
- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner DeterminationBeatrice Napolitano, Olivier Cailloux, Paolo Viappiani. 51-67 [doi]
- Incremental Elicitation of Preferences: Optimist or Pessimist?Loïc Adam, Sébastien Destercke. 71-85 [doi]
- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference TreesXudong Liu, Miroslaw Truszczynski. 86-100 [doi]
- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet IntegralsHugo Martin 0002, Patrice Perny. 101-116 [doi]
- In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a ConstitutionBen Abramowitz, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon. 119-131 [doi]
- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed VotersRuben Becker, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz, Hugo Gilbert. 132-146 [doi]
- Computing Kemeny Rankings from d-Euclidean PreferencesThekla Hamm, Martin Lackner, Anna Rapberger. 147-161 [doi]
- Iterative Deliberation via Metric AggregationGil Ben Zvi, Eyal Leizerovich, Nimrod Talmon. 162-176 [doi]
- Obvious Manipulability of Voting RulesHaris Aziz 0001, Alexander Lam. 179-193 [doi]
- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting GamesJoanna Kaczmarek, Jörg Rothe. 194-208 [doi]
- Strategic Voting in Negotiating TeamsLeora Schmerler, Noam Hazon. 209-223 [doi]
- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting RulesYongjie Yang 0001. 224-240 [doi]
- Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference GraphsNina Chiarelli, Clément Dallard, Andreas Darmann, Stefan Lendl, Martin Milanic, Peter Mursic, Nevena Pivac, Ulrich Pferschy. 243-257 [doi]
- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible GoodsLaurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Anaëlle Wilczynski. 258-272 [doi]
- On Reachable Assignments in CyclesLuis Müller, Matthias Bentert. 273-288 [doi]
- Minimizing and Balancing Envy Among Agents Using Ordered Weighted AverageParham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet. 289-303 [doi]
- Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions Under Matroid ConstraintsNawal Benabbou, Cassandre Leroy, Thibaut Lust, Patrice Perny. 307-322 [doi]
- Necessary and Possible Interaction in a 2-Maxitive Sugeno Integral ModelPaul Alain Kaldjob Kaldjob, Brice Mayag, Denis Bouyssou. 323-337 [doi]
- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social ChoiceBen Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon. 341-356 [doi]
- Hedonic Diversity Games RevisitedAndreas Darmann. 357-372 [doi]
- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable MatchingKshitija Taywade, Judy Goldsmith, Brent Harrison. 375-389 [doi]
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial InformationTaiki Todo, Ryoji Wada, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo. 390-405 [doi]
- Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and RulesHaris Aziz 0001, Aditya Ganguly. 409-423 [doi]
- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory BudgetingDorothea Baumeister, Linus Boes, Johanna Hillebrand. 424-439 [doi]