Abstract is missing.
- Computing Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph GamesKevin Leyton-Brown, Navin A. R. Bhat. [doi]
- Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation RevelationTuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin. [doi]
- 05011 Executive Summary - Computing and MarketsDaniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm. [doi]
- Local-Effect GamesKevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz. [doi]
- Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party ComputationsRann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz. [doi]
- Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional TypesHongwei Gui, Rudolf Müller, Rakesh V. Vohra. [doi]
- A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible MechanismsRudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf. [doi]
- The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social CostMartin Gairing, Thomas Lücking, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien. [doi]
- Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid AuctionsFelix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham. [doi]
- Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue BargainingHenner Gimpel. [doi]
- Fundamentals in Discrete Convex AnalysisKazuo Murota. [doi]
- Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial AuctionsRobert Day, S. Raghavan. [doi]
- 05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and MarketsDaniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm. [doi]
- Selfish Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to Maximum CongestionRainer Feldmann. [doi]
- Self-Confirming Price Prediction for Bidding in Simultaneous Ascending AuctionsAnna Osepayshvili, Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. [doi]
- A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing Capacity in a Communication NetworkEdward Anderson, Frank Kelly, Richard Steinberg. [doi]
- Congestion games with failuresMichal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz. [doi]
- The PageRank AxiomsAlon Altman. [doi]
- Automated Mechanism DesignTuomas Sandholm. [doi]
- The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form GamesItai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz. [doi]