Abstract is missing.
- A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen ConjectureGeorge Christodoulou 0001. [doi]
- Ambiguous ContractsMichal Feldman. [doi]
- Duality in Market DesignAlexander Teytelboym. [doi]
- Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on NetworksStanislaw Kazmierowski, Marcin Dziubinski. 3-21 [doi]
- Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a PathKatharina Eickhoff, Lennart Kauther, Britta Peis. 22-39 [doi]
- Computational Complexity of Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Multi-player GamesVittorio Bilò, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Marios Mavronicolas. 40-57 [doi]
- Arbitrary Profit Sharing in Federated Learning Utility GamesEirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias. 58-70 [doi]
- The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing ReviewsMarios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis. 71-89 [doi]
- Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation GamesShaul Rosner, Tami Tamir. 90-108 [doi]
- Single-Peaked Jump Schelling GamesTobias Friedrich 0001, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Lars Seifert. 111-126 [doi]
- Parameterized Complexity of GerrymanderingAndrew Fraser, Brian Lavallee, Blair D. Sullivan. 127-141 [doi]
- Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory BudgetingHaris Aziz 0001, Sujit Gujar, Manisha Padala, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen. 142-160 [doi]
- Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and ExperimentsNiclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Lukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk 0001. 161-178 [doi]
- Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain AffinitiesCyrus Cousins, Justin Payan, Yair Zick. 179-197 [doi]
- Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in NetworksLata Narayanan, Yasaman Sabbagh. 198-217 [doi]
- Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Under Cost UtilitiesSirin Botan, Angus Ritossa, Mashbat Suzuki, Toby Walsh. 221-238 [doi]
- Fair Algorithm Design: Fair and Efficacious Machine SchedulingApril Niu, Agnes Totschnig, Adrian Vetta. 239-256 [doi]
- EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based ApproachYusuke Kobayashi 0001, Ryoga Mahara, Souta Sakamoto. 257-270 [doi]
- The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few Agent TypesUmang Bhaskar, Neeldhara Misra, Aditi Sethia, Rohit Vaish. 271-289 [doi]
- The Frontier of Intractability for EFX with Two AgentsPaul W. Goldberg, Kasper Høgh, Alexandros Hollender. 290-307 [doi]
- Computational Complexity of k-Stable MatchingsHaris Aziz 0001, Gergely Csáji, Ágnes Cseh. 311-328 [doi]
- Optimizing over Serial DictatorshipsIoannis Caragiannis, Nidhi Rathi. 329-346 [doi]
- Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and EfficientlyIoannis Caragiannis, Shivika Narang. 347-364 [doi]
- Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate LocationsPanagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris, Rongsen Zhang. 365-382 [doi]
- Threshold Mechanisms for Dynamic Procurement with AbandonmentAli Khodabakhsh 0002, Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Jimmy Horn. 383-400 [doi]
- Strategy-Proof Budgeting via a VCG-Like MechanismJonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir. 401-418 [doi]