Abstract is missing.
- Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient marketsYair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura. 1-8 [doi]
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed marketMoshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Elan Pavlov. 9-20 [doi]
- Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratificationAlessandro Acquisti. 21-29 [doi]
- Stopping outgoing spamJoshua T. Goodman, Robert Rounthwaite. 30-39 [doi]
- An economic answer to unsolicited communicationThede Loder, Marshall W. van Alstyne, Rick Wash. 40-50 [doi]
- Expressive negotiation over donations to charitiesVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 51-60 [doi]
- Mechanism design for online real-time schedulingRyan Porter. 61-70 [doi]
- Adaptive limited-supply online auctionsMohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes. 71-80 [doi]
- Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete informationSatinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman. 81-90 [doi]
- Limited reputation sharing in P2P systemsSergio Marti, Hector Garcia-Molina. 91-101 [doi]
- Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networksMichal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Ion Stoica, John Chuang. 102-111 [doi]
- Collaboration of untrusting peers with changing interestsBaruch Awerbuch, Boaz Patt-Shamir, David Peleg, Mark R. Tuttle. 112-119 [doi]
- Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctionsAranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani. 120-124 [doi]
- On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goodsRichard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, Amin Saberi. 125-131 [doi]
- Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctionsVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 132-141 [doi]
- Customizable description and dynamic discovery for web servicesWooYoung Kim, Alan H. Karp. 142-151 [doi]
- A stochastic programming approach to scheduling in TAC SCMMichael Benisch, Amy R. Greenwald, Victor Naroditskiy, Michael Carl Tschantz. 152-159 [doi]
- Toward an automated verification of certificates of authenticityDarko Kirovski. 160-169 [doi]
- A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregationDavid M. Pennock. 170-179 [doi]
- Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitationSébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes. 180-188 [doi]
- Competitive algorithms for VWAP and limit order tradingSham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, Yishay Mansour, Luis E. Ortiz. 189-198 [doi]
- Customer-centric innovations for search and e-commerceUdi Manber. 199 [doi]
- Product context in EC websites: how consumer uncertainty and purchase risk drive navigational needsSarah Spiekermann. 200-207 [doi]
- Evaluating example-based search toolsPearl Huan Z. Pu, Pratyush Kumar. 208-217 [doi]
- Characterizing customer groups for an e-commerce websiteQing Wang, Dwight J. Makaroff, H. Keith Edwards. 218-227 [doi]
- A game tree strategy for automated negotiationAlan H. Karp, Ren Wu, Kay-Yut Chen, Alex Zhang. 228-229 [doi]
- Transitive votingMoshe Tennenholtz. 230-231 [doi]
- HYRIWYG: leveraging personalization to elicit honest recommendationsAna Cristina Bicharra Garcia, Martin Ekstrom, Hans Bjornsson. 232-233 [doi]
- Experimental study of market reputation mechanismsKay-Yut Chen, Tad Hogg, Nathan Wozny. 234-235 [doi]
- Enhancing reputation mechanisms via online social networksTad Hogg, Lada A. Adamic. 236-237 [doi]
- Presentation and structure of substitutes valuationsMeir Bing, Daniel J. Lehmann, Paul Milgrom. 238-239 [doi]
- Object auras: a mobile retail and product annotation systemMarc A. Smith, Duncan Davenport, Howard Hwa, Tammara Combs Turner. 240-241 [doi]
- Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location gamesStefano Leonardi, Guido Schäfer. 242-243 [doi]
- Worst-case payoffs of a location gameShuchi Chawla, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha. 244-245 [doi]
- Behavorial mechanism design as an online marketing toolYoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz. 246-247 [doi]
- On the economics of anti-counterfeitingYacov Yacobi. 248-249 [doi]
- Simple primal-dual auctions are not possibleDebasis Mishra. 250-251 [doi]
- On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract]Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen. 252-253 [doi]
- SNACK: incorporating social network information in automated collaborative filteringChuck Lam. 254-255 [doi]
- A hybrid negotiation strategy mechanism in an automated negotiation systemSheng Zhang, Song Ye, Fillia Makedon, James Ford. 256-257 [doi]
- Designing efficient online trading systemsRyan Porter, Yoav Shoham. 258-259 [doi]
- Utility-based neighbourhood formation for efficient and robust collaborative filteringMichael P. O Mahony, Neil J. Hurley, Guenole C. M. Silvestre. 260-261 [doi]
- Computational criticisms of the revelation principleVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 262-263 [doi]
- Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility resultKate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm. 264-265 [doi]
- Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg paymentsVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 266-267 [doi]
- Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctionsAnton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm. 268-269 [doi]