Table of Contents

• Beyond moulin mechanismsAranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan. 1-10 [doi]
• Approximately maximizing efficiency and revenue in polyhedral environmentsThành Nguyen, Éva Tardos. 11-19 [doi]
• Generalized trade reduction mechanismsMira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov. 20-29 [doi]
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG paymentsMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer. 30-39 [doi]
• Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctionsJon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pal, Clifford Stein. 40-49 [doi]
• Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctionsSébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock. 50-56 [doi]
• Dynamic price competition on the internet: advertising auctionsJuan Feng, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang. 57-58 [doi]
• An equilibrium model for matching impatient demand and patient supply over timeGarud Iyengar, Anuj Kumar. 59-65 [doi]
• On threshold behavior in query incentive networksEsteban Arcaute, Adam Kirsch, Ravi Kumar, David Liben-Nowell, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 66-74 [doi]
• The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networksNicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, Tom Wexler. 75-83 [doi]
• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection gamesAmir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour. 84-92 [doi]
• Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruismYogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson. 93-102 [doi]
• Congestion games with malicious playersMoshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 103-112 [doi]
• Shake it up baby: scheduling with package auctionsKan Takeuchi, John Lin, Yan Chen, Thomas A. Finholt. 113 [doi]
• Evaluating compound critiquing recommenders: a real-user studyJames Reilly, Jiyong Zhang, Lorraine McGinty, Pearl Pu, Barry Smyth. 114-123 [doi]
• Indirect partner interaction in peer-to-peer networks: stimulating cooperation by means of structureStephan Schosser, Klemens Böhm, Bodo Vogt. 124-133 [doi]
• Understanding user behavior in online feedback reportingArjun Talwar, Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings. 134-142 [doi]
• Trading networks with price-setting agentsLarry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos. 143-151 [doi]
• On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decompositionGeorg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco. 152-161 [doi]
• Computing good nash equilibria in graphical gamesEdith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg. 162-171 [doi]
• Stochastic packing-market planningDaniel Golovin. 172-181 [doi]
• Red Opal: product-feature scoring from reviewsChristopher Scaffidi, Kevin Bierhoff, Eric Chang, Mikhael Felker, Herman Ng, Chun Jin. 182-191 [doi]
• Recommender systems and their impact on sales diversityDaniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar. 192-199 [doi]
• Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback paymentsRadu Jurca, Boi Faltings. 200-209 [doi]
• Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resourcesMichal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz. 210-217 [doi]
• Pricing of partially compatible productsDavid Kempe, Adam Meyerson, Nainesh Solanki, Ramnath Chellappa. 218-226 [doi]
• Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctionsYagil Engel, Michael P. Wellman. 227-236 [doi]
• Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded biddersJohn O. Ledyard. 237-242 [doi]
• Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuationsShuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg. 243-251 [doi]
• Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicityRon Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy. 252-261 [doi]
• Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctionsMatthew Cary, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, Michael Schwarz. 262-271 [doi]
• Optimal delivery of sponsored search advertisements subject to budget constraintsZoë Abrams, Ofer Mendelevitch, John Tomlin. 272-278 [doi]
• Mediators in position auctionsItai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz. 279-287 [doi]
• Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimatesMohammad Mahdian, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi. 288-294 [doi]
• Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchangesDavid J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm. 295-304 [doi]
• Optimizing scrip systems: efficiency, crashes, hoarders, and altruistsIan A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern. 305-315 [doi]
• A strategic model for information marketsEvdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami. 316-325 [doi]
• Betting on permutationsYiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Evdokia Nikolova, David M. Pennock. 326-335 [doi]
• Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex coverEdith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg. 336-345 [doi]
• Mechanisms for multi-unit auctionsShahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan. 346-351 [doi]
• Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategiesTomás Feder, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi. 352-354 [doi]
• Progress in approximate nash equilibriaConstantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 355-358 [doi]
• Joint workshop on the economics of networked systems and incentive-based computingDaniel Grosu, Ratul Mahajan, Rahul Sami. 359-360 [doi]
• Second workshop on prediction marketsYiling Chen, John O. Ledyard, David M. Pennock, Eric Zitzewitz. 361-362 [doi]
• EC 2007 workshop outline -- DEECS 2007: the 3rd international workshop on data engineering issues in e-commerce and servicesMehmet Sayal, Martin Hepp. 363-364 [doi]
• Prediction markets: economics, computation, and mechanism designYiling Chen. 365 [doi]
• Online trust and reputation systemsNeel Sundaresan. 366-367 [doi]
• Modeling complex networks for electronic commerceFoster J. Provost, Arun Sundararajan. 368 [doi]
• Tutorial on sponsored searchKartik Hosanagar, Michael Schwarz. 369 [doi]