Abstract is missing.
- On aggregation bias in sponsored search data: existence andimplicationsVibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar, Peter S. Fader. 1 [doi]
- Optimal bidding in multi-item multi-slot sponsored search auctionsVibhanshu Abhishek, Kartik Hosanagar. 2 [doi]
- Combinatorial auctions with restricted complementsIttai Abraham, Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden. 3-16 [doi]
- Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reductionSaeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian. 17 [doi]
- Online prophet-inequality matching with applications to ad allocationSaeed Alaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Vahid Liaghat. 18-35 [doi]
- Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networksNoga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz. 36 [doi]
- Finding overlapping communities in social networks: toward a rigorous approachSanjeev Arora, Rong Ge, Sushant Sachdeva, Grant Schoenebeck. 37-54 [doi]
- Strategyproofness in the large as a desideratum for market designEduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish. 55 [doi]
- On bitcoin and red balloonsMoshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar. 56-73 [doi]
- Dynamic pricing with limited supplyMoshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 74-91 [doi]
- Optimal mechanisms for selling informationMoshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme. 92-109 [doi]
- Optimization with demand oraclesAshwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren. 110-127 [doi]
- Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurementAshwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, Yaron Singer. 128-145 [doi]
- Social influence in social advertising: evidence from field experimentsEytan Bakshy, Dean Eckles, Rong Yan, Itamar Rosenn. 146-161 [doi]
- Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited informationDirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu, Edmund M. Yeh. 162-178 [doi]
- Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalitiesAnand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala. 179-196 [doi]
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian viewCraig Boutilier, Ioannis Caragiannis, Simi Haber, Tyler Lu, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet. 197-214 [doi]
- A bayesian market makerAseem Brahma, Mithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail. 215-232 [doi]
- Computing dominance-based solution conceptsFelix Brandt, Markus Brill. 233 [doi]
- Send mixed signals: earn more, work lessPeter Bro Miltersen, Or Sheffet. 234-247 [doi]
- The groupon effect on yelp ratings: a root cause analysisJohn W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas. 248-265 [doi]
- Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verificationIoannis Caragiannis, Edith Elkind, Mario Szegedy, Lan Yu. 266-283 [doi]
- Approximate pure nash equilibria in weighted congestion games: existence, efficient computation, and structureIoannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik. 284-301 [doi]
- Traffic shaping to optimize ad deliveryDeepayan Chakrabarti, Erik Vee. 302-318 [doi]
- Ad serving using a compact allocation planPeiji Chen, Wenjing Ma, Srinath Mandalapu, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee, Manfai Yu, Jason Y. Zien. 319-336 [doi]
- Tatonnement in ongoing markets of complementary goodsYun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Ashish Rastogi. 337-354 [doi]
- How to schedule a cascade in an arbitrary graphFlavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Alessandro Panconesi. 355-368 [doi]
- Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivalsOlivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev. 369 [doi]
- Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism designConstantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg. 370-387 [doi]
- Asymptotically optimal algorithm for stochastic adwordsNikhil R. Devanur, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yossi Azar. 388-404 [doi]
- The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctionsShahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák. 405-422 [doi]
- Mechanism design on discrete lines and cyclesElad Dokow, Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Ilan Nehama. 423-440 [doi]
- Simpler sybil-proof mechanisms for multi-level marketingFabio Drucker, Lisa Fleischer. 441-458 [doi]
- A tractable combinatorial market maker using constraint generationMiroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock. 459-476 [doi]
- Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiersPaul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes. 477-494 [doi]
- Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agentsFederico Echenique, Adam Wierman. 495 [doi]
- Clone structures in voters' preferencesEdith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko. 496-513 [doi]
- Signaling schemes for revenue maximizationYuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz. 514-531 [doi]
- Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgetsMichal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Piotr Sankowski. 532-549 [doi]
- Interviewing secretaries in parallelMoran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz. 550-567 [doi]
- Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with dataLisa Fleischer, Yu-Han Lyu. 568-585 [doi]
- Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item biddingHu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi. 586 [doi]
- Safe opponent exploitationSamuel Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm. 587-604 [doi]
- A truthful learning mechanism for contextual multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalitiesNicola Gatti, Alessandro Lazaric, Francesco Trovò. 605-622 [doi]
- The structure of online diffusion networksSharad Goel, Duncan J. Watts, Daniel G. Goldstein. 623-638 [doi]
- Improving the effectiveness of time-based display advertisingDaniel G. Goldstein, Randolph Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri. 639-654 [doi]
- Mean field equilibria of multiarmed bandit gamesRamakrishna Gummadi, Ramesh Johari, Jia Yuan Yu. 655 [doi]
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple itemsSergiu Hart, Noam Nisan. 656 [doi]
- Secondary spectrum auctions for symmetric and submodular biddersMartin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim. 657-671 [doi]
- Striving for social statusNicole Immorlica, Rachel Kranton, Gregory Stoddard. 672 [doi]
- Information and the value of execution guaranteesKrishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi. 673 [doi]
- Accuracy improvements for multi-criteria recommender systemsDietmar Jannach, Zeynep Karakaya, Fatih Gedikli. 674-689 [doi]
- Behavioral experiments on a network formation gameMichael Kearns, J. Stephen Judd, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 690-704 [doi]
- Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctionsJohn K. Lai, David C. Parkes. 705-722 [doi]
- Matching models for preference-sensitive group purchasingTyler Lu, Craig Boutilier. 723-740 [doi]
- To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertisingMohammad Mahdian, Arpita Ghosh, R. Preston McAfee, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 741-753 [doi]
- Two-sided search with expertsYinon Nahum, David Sarne, Sanmay Das, Onn Shehory. 754-771 [doi]
- Coalitional bargaining in networksThanh Nguyen. 772 [doi]
- Local bargaining and endogenous fluctuationsThanh Nguyen. 773 [doi]
- Privacy-aware mechanism designKobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, Rann Smorodinsky. 774-789 [doi]
- Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depthAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm. 790-807 [doi]
- Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilitiesDavid C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah. 808-825 [doi]
- Conducting truthful surveys, cheaplyAaron Roth, Grant Schoenebeck. 826-843 [doi]
- Supply-limiting mechanismsTim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Qiqi Yan. 844-861 [doi]
- The price of anarchy in games of incomplete informationTim Roughgarden. 862-879 [doi]
- Lossy stochastic game abstraction with boundsTuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh. 880-897 [doi]
- Market user interface designSven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan. 898-915 [doi]
- Computing a proper equilibrium of a bimatrix gameTroels Bjerre Sørensen. 916-928 [doi]
- Bayesian sequential auctionsVasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos. 929-944 [doi]
- Cooperation and assortativity with endogenous partner selectionJing Wang, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts. 945 [doi]
- Single-call mechanismsChristopher A. Wilkens, Balasubramanian Sivan. 946-963 [doi]
- Peer prediction without a common priorJens Witkowski, David C. Parkes. 964-981 [doi]
- Computing the margin of victory for various voting rulesLirong Xia. 982-999 [doi]