Table of Contents

• Fair Algorithms for Machine LearningMichael Kearns. 1 [doi]
• Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and ComparisonAndrew Chi-Chih Yao. 3-20 [doi]
• Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of ServiceVasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden. 21-38 [doi]
• The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General CaseNikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg. 39-40 [doi]
• Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private DemandsNikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas. 41-42 [doi]
• The Double Clinching Auction for WageringRupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 43-60 [doi]
• Forecast AggregationItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky. 61-62 [doi]
• Machine-Learning Aided Peer PredictionYang Liu, Yiling Chen. 63-80 [doi]
• Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous UsersArpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah 0001. 81-98 [doi]
• The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive AlgorithmSepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li. 99-116 [doi]
• Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent ActionsYash Kanoria, Daniela Sabán. 117 [doi]
• Matching while LearningRamesh Johari, Vijay Kamble, Yash Kanoria. 119 [doi]
• Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's MatchAvinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer. 121-122 [doi]
• A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated GamesNoam Nisan, Gali Noti. 123 [doi]
• The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of RandomnessJon M. Kleinberg, Annie Liang, Sendhil Mullainathan. 125-126 [doi]
• Comparison-based ChoicesJon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Johan Ugander. 127-144 [doi]
• Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest InteractionSepehr Assadi. 145-162 [doi]
• The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation ConstraintsDirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 163-164 [doi]
• Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale UtilitiesSantiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme. 165 [doi]
• Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic BuyersNicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart. 167-168 [doi]
• Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of CustomersJosé R. Correa, Patricio Foncea, Ruben Hoeksma, Tim Oosterwijk, Tjark Vredeveld. 169-186 [doi]
• Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial RegulationFrank Cheng, Michael P. Wellman. 187-203 [doi]
• Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call MarketsErik Brinkman, Michael P. Wellman. 205-221 [doi]
• Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and ComputationPieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer. 223-240 [doi]
• Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose ChaseJuan-Camilo Castillo, Dan Knoepfle, Glen Weyl. 241-242 [doi]
• Stable SecretariesYakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky. 243-244 [doi]
• Computing Equilibrium in Matching MarketsSaeed Alaei, Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi, Éva Tardos. 245-261 [doi]
• Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching MarketsItai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi 0002. 263 [doi]
• Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading NetworksRavi Jagadeesan. 265 [doi]
• Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong OpinionsGerdus Benade, Anson Kahng, Ariel D. Procaccia. 267-284 [doi]
• Voting in the LimelightRonen Gradwohl. 285 [doi]
• Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness PropertiesAshish Goel, Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Kamesh Munagala. 287-304 [doi]
• Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative CandidatesYu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe 0001. 305-322 [doi]
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: AbstractAlon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg. 323 [doi]
• Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item PricingElliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar. 325-342 [doi]
• The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional BiddersAlon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg. 343 [doi]
• Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered AssortmentsGerardo Berbeglia, Gwenaël Joret. 345-346 [doi]
• Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic CustomersDavid Lingenbrink, Krishnamurthy Iyer. 347 [doi]
• Information Sharing and Privacy in NetworksRonen Gradwohl. 349-350 [doi]
• Algorithmic Persuasion with No ExternalitiesShaddin Dughmi, Haifeng Xu. 351-368 [doi]
• Fairness Incentives for Myopic AgentsSampath Kannan, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh V. Vohra, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 369-386 [doi]
• Combinatorial Cost SharingShahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia. 387-404 [doi]
• Makespan Minimization via Posted PricesMichal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman. 405-422 [doi]
• Truth and Regret in Online SchedulingShuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Janardhan Kulkarni, Rad Niazadeh. 423-440 [doi]
• Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under UncertaintyGiorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa. 441-458 [doi]
• Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social WelfareRichard Cole 0001, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod. 459-460 [doi]
• Controlled Dynamic Fair DivisionEric J. Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi. 461-478 [doi]
• A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake CuttingAriel D. Procaccia, Junxing Wang. 479-495 [doi]
• Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online LearningSébastien Bubeck, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang 0002, Rad Niazadeh. 497-514 [doi]
• Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic CustomersYiwei Chen, Cong Shi. 515 [doi]
• Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation FrameworkSiddhartha Banerjee, Daniel Freund 0001, Thodoris Lykouris. 517 [doi]
• Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare MaximizationAaron Roth, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Jonathan Ullman, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 519-536 [doi]
• The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton. 537-538 [doi]
• Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & ReviewsShrabastee Banerjee, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Georgios Zervas. 539 [doi]
• Learning in the Repeated Secretary ProblemDaniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri, James R. Wright. 541 [doi]
• Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of BurstinessMohammad Akbarpour, Matthew O. Jackson. 543 [doi]
• Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on FairnessGeorgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, George Christodoulou 0001, Evangelos Markakis. 545-562 [doi]
• From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial CurrenciesArtur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer. 563-564 [doi]
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious StrategyproofnessSophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski. 565 [doi]
• Planning with Multiple BiasesJon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan. 567-584 [doi]
• Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-MakingIlan Lobel, Renato Paes Leme, Adrian Vladu. 585 [doi]
• Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer TreatmentsGer Yang, Georgios Piliouras, David Basanta. 587 [doi]
• Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple MechanismsJohannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu, Mingfei Zhao. 589-590 [doi]
• Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial AuctionsRiccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Turchetta. 591-608 [doi]
• Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and EquilibriumSantiago R. Balseiro, Yonatan Gur. 609 [doi]
• Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic AgentsSimina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta. 611-628 [doi]
• Fair Public Decision MakingVincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah 0001. 629-646 [doi]
• Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair DivisionSiddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy. 647-664 [doi]
• Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive NetworksChristian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes. 665-672 [doi]
• Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer MechanismsJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Westkamp. 673-674 [doi]
• Stable Matching with Proportionality ConstraintsThanh Nguyen 0001, Rakesh Vohra. 675-676 [doi]
• Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market DesignBenjamin N. Roth, Ran I. Shorrer. 677 [doi]
• How (Not) to Allocate Affordable HousingNick Arnosti, Peng Shi. 679 [doi]
• Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many PlayersItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko. 681-691 [doi]
• Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form GamesChristian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm. 693 [doi]
• A Network Game of Dynamic TrafficZhigang Cao, Bo Chen, Xujin Chen, Changjun Wang. 695-696 [doi]
• A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security GamesSoheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 697-714 [doi]