Abstract is missing.
- Obvious Dominance and Random PriorityMarek Pycia, Peter Troyan. 1 [doi]
- Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown DistributionJosé R. Correa, Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Kevin Schewior. 3-17 [doi]
- Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the RescueAlon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin. 19-20 [doi]
- Stable Fractional MatchingsIoannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Rohit Vaish. 21-39 [doi]
- Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-OffsJiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron, Manuel Sorge. 41-59 [doi]
- Stability in Matching Markets with Complex ConstraintsThành Nguyen, Hai Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym. 61 [doi]
- Trading Networks with General PreferencesJan Christoph Schlegel. 63 [doi]
- Fundamental Limits of Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete ChoiceArjun Seshadri, Johan Ugander. 65-66 [doi]
- How Do Machine Learning Algorithms Perform in Predicting Hospital Choices?: Evidence from Changing EnvironmentsDevesh Raval, Ted Rosenbaum, Nathan E. Wilson. 67-68 [doi]
- Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning ApproachDmitry Ivanov, Alexander Nesterov. 69-70 [doi]
- The Congressional Classification Challenge: Domain Specificity and Partisan IntensityHao Yan, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Sirui Li, Betsy Sinclair. 71-89 [doi]
- Nearly Optimal Pricing Algorithms for Production Constrained and Laminar Bayesian SelectionNima Anari, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli. 91-92 [doi]
- Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non AdaptiveNikolai Gravin, Hongao Wang. 93-109 [doi]
- Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate PriorsPaul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim. 111-129 [doi]
- Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory InspectionHedyeh Beyhaghi, Robert Kleinberg. 131-132 [doi]
- Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and k-CoresOzan Candogan. 133-134 [doi]
- Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible ExplorationLee Cohen, Yishay Mansour. 135-151 [doi]
- Social Learning and the Innkeeper's ChallengeGal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz. 153-170 [doi]
- The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling ApproachGuy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 171-172 [doi]
- Regression EquilibriumOmer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz. 173-191 [doi]
- Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market: Extended AbstractZoë B. Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson. 193 [doi]
- Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform ControlApostolos Filippas, Srikanth Jagabathula, Arun Sundararajan. 195-196 [doi]
- The Supply and Demand Effects of Review PlatformsGregory Lewis, Georgios Zervas. 197 [doi]
- Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender SystemsAkos Lada, Alexander Peysakhovich, Diego Aparicio, Michael Bailey. 199-213 [doi]
- You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer SearchCharles Hodgson, Gregory Lewis. 215 [doi]
- Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item AuctionsYang Cai 0001, Mingfei Zhao. 217-236 [doi]
- Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item PricingShuchi Chawla 0001, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos. 237-238 [doi]
- Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional ComplementaritiesYang Cai 0001, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, R. Preston McAfee. 239-240 [doi]
- Consumer-Optimal Market SegmentationNima Haghpapanah, Ron Siegel. 241-242 [doi]
- The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random NetworksJiali Huang, Ankur Mani, Zizhuo Wang. 243-244 [doi]
- Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice RulesKamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang. 245-262 [doi]
- Group Fairness in Committee SelectionYu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang. 263-279 [doi]
- No Stratification Without RepresentationGerdus Benadè, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia. 281-314 [doi]
- Equitable Voting RulesLaurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, Leeat Yariv. 315 [doi]
- Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson GamesFrançois Durand, Antonin Macé, Matías Núñez. 317-320 [doi]
- Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity RequirementsYannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, Lior Kovalio, Assaf Romm. 321 [doi]
- Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in IndiaSurender Baswana, Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, Sharat Chandran, Yashodhan Kanoria, Utkarsh Patange. 323-324 [doi]
- School Choice in ChileJose Correa, Rafael Epstein, Juan Escobar, Ignacio Rios, Bastián Bahamondes, Carlos Bonet, Natalie Epstein, Nicolas Aramayo, Martin Castillo, Andrés Cristi, Boris Epstein. 325-343 [doi]
- Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority StructureMoshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm. 345 [doi]
- Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent SuccessesRan I. Shorrer. 347-348 [doi]
- Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange: A Dynamic Weighted Matching ModelZhuoshu Li, Kelsey Lieberman, William Macke, Sofia Carrillo, Chien-Ju Ho, Jason Wellen, Sanmay Das. 349-367 [doi]
- Simple versus Optimal ContractsPaul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 369-387 [doi]
- Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism DesignIan Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel. 389-390 [doi]
- Sample-Based Optimal PricingAmine Allouah, Omar Besbes. 391 [doi]
- Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable ResourcesOmar Besbes, Adam N. Elmachtoub, Yunjie Sun. 393-394 [doi]
- Power of Dynamic Pricing in Revenue Management with Strategic (Forward-looking) CustomersYiwei Chen, Stefanus Jasin. 395 [doi]
- Dynamic Learning and Market Making in Spread Betting Markets with Informed BettorsJohn R. Birge, Yifan Feng, N. Bora Keskin, Adam Schultz. 397-398 [doi]
- Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful MechanismsJason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart. 399-416 [doi]
- Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated ValuesAlexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. 417-418 [doi]
- The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal RevenueHu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa. 419-420 [doi]
- Seeding with Costly Network InformationDean Eckles, Hossein Esfandiari, Elchanan Mossel, M. Amin Rahimian. 421-422 [doi]
- Influence Maximization on Undirected Graphs: Towards Closing the (1-1/e) GapGrant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao. 423-453 [doi]
- Displaying Things in Common to Encourage Friendship Formation: A Large Randomized Field ExperimentTianshu Sun, Sean J. Taylor. 455 [doi]
- Graphon GamesFrancesca Parise, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. 457-458 [doi]
- Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake ProtocolsJonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg. 459-473 [doi]
- Mind the MiningGuy Goren, Alexander Spiegelman. 475-487 [doi]
- Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work MiningAmos Fiat, Anna Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 489-502 [doi]
- Information and Learning in Heterogeneous MarketsYaarit Even, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Xavier Vives. 503 [doi]
- High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation: Lenstra Empowered by N-fold Integer ProgrammingRobert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk 0001, Dusan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier. 505-523 [doi]
- Communication Complexity of Cake CuttingSimina Brânzei, Noam Nisan. 525 [doi]
- Envy-Freeness Up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating ItemsIoannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Xin Huang. 527-545 [doi]
- Fair Cake-Cutting in PracticeMaria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-haLevi. 547-548 [doi]
- Robust Non-Bayesian Social LearningItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov. 549-550 [doi]
- Local Non-Bayesian Social Learning with Stubborn AgentsDaniel Vial, Vijay Subramanian. 551-552 [doi]
- Naive Learning Through Probability MatchingItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank. 553 [doi]
- Information Inundation on Platforms and ImplicationsGad Allon, Kimon Drakopoulos, Vahideh H. Manshadi. 555-556 [doi]
- The Implications of Pricing on Social LearningItai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky. 557-558 [doi]
- On the Price of Anarchy for flows over timeJosé Correa, Andrés Cristi, Tim Oosterwijk. 559-577 [doi]
- Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine CostsRoberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder 0002, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. 579-580 [doi]
- Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving CarsMichael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz 0002. 581-582 [doi]
- Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing PlatformsHongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes. 583 [doi]
- Spatial Capacity PlanningOmar Besbes, Francisco Castro, Ilan Lobel. 585 [doi]
- Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction MarketsVincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Chris Wilkens. 587 [doi]
- LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve PricesMahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme. 589 [doi]
- Dashboard Mechanisms for Online MarketplacesJason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter. 591-592 [doi]
- Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes BackLudwig Dierks, Sven Seuken. 593 [doi]
- Optimal Pricing in Markets with Non-Convex CostsNavid Azizan Ruhi, Yu Su, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Adam Wierman. 595 [doi]
- Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond ConvexitySoheil Behnezhad, Avrim Blum, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Saeed Seddighin. 597-616 [doi]
- Iterated Deep Reinforcement Learning in Games: History-Aware Training for Improved StabilityMason Wright, Yongzhao Wang, Michael P. Wellman. 617-636 [doi]
- Robust Commitments and Partial ReputationVidya Muthukumar, Anant Sahai. 637-638 [doi]
- Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg GamesJiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, Michael J. Wooldridge. 639-657 [doi]
- Prior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical EstimationYiling Chen, Shuran Zheng. 659-677 [doi]
- How to Sell a Dataset?: Pricing Policies for Data MonetizationSameer Mehta, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, Vijay S. Mookerjee. 679 [doi]
- Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data CommercializationParinaz Naghizadeh, Arunesh Sinha. 681-699 [doi]
- A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic SolutionAnish Agarwal, Munther A. Dahleh, Tuhin Sarkar. 701-726 [doi]
- Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios for Online Edge-weighted Bipartite Matching and BeyondWill Ma, David Simchi-Levi. 727-728 [doi]
- Edge Weighted Online Windowed MatchingItai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi, Chris Sholley. 729-742 [doi]
- Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory ManagementShipra Agrawal 0001, Randy Jia. 743-744 [doi]
- Computing Large Market Equilibria using AbstractionsChristian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. 745-746 [doi]
- Computing Core-Stable Outcomes in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained BiddersMartin Bichler, Stefan Waldherr. 747 [doi]
- Adaptive-Price Combinatorial AuctionsSébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin. 749-750 [doi]
- Truthful Aggregation of Budget ProposalsRupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 751-752 [doi]
- Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous PreferencesHaris Aziz 0001, Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin. 753-781 [doi]
- Principal-Agent VCG ContractsRon Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash. 783 [doi]
- Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility MaximizationTaylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 785-803 [doi]
- Individual Fairness in HindsightSwati Gupta, Vijay Kamble. 805-806 [doi]
- Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and InterpretabilityJon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan. 807-808 [doi]
- Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of FairnessSumegha Garg, Michael P. Kim, Omer Reingold. 809-824 [doi]
- How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?Jon M. Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan. 825-844 [doi]
- Price of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty ContestHadi Elzayn, Zachary Schutzman. 845-863 [doi]
- Obvious ManipulationsPeter Troyan, Thayer Morrill. 865 [doi]
- Estimating Approximate Incentive CompatibilityMaria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik. 867 [doi]
- The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with PriorsEvangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos. 869-883 [doi]
- Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear UtilityYiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li. 885-886 [doi]
- Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive ValuationsNick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Chenhao Zhang. 887-900 [doi]
- Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and OnlineGeorgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer. 901-919 [doi]