Abstract is missing.
- The Asymmetric Matrix Partition ProblemNoga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz. 1-14 [doi]
- Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani, Adrian Vetta. 15-23 [doi]
- The Computational Complexity of Random Serial DictatorshipHaris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill. 24-25 [doi]
- Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative EnvironmentsYoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic. 26-39 [doi]
- Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable GoodsMohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam. 40-53 [doi]
- On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion GamesVittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli. 54-67 [doi]
- Trading Agent Kills Market Information - Evidence from Online Social LendingRainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags. 68-81 [doi]
- Designing Markets for Daily DealsYang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner. 82-95 [doi]
- The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable StrategiesVincent Conitzer. 96-108 [doi]
- The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism RevisitedJosé R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. 109-120 [doi]
- Can Credit Increase Revenue?Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos. 121-133 [doi]
- Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling SchedulingChristoph Dürr, Lukasz Jez, Oscar C. Vásquez. 134-145 [doi]
- Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial AuctionsPaul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger. 146-159 [doi]
- Limits of Efficiency in Sequential AuctionsMichal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 160-173 [doi]
- Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz. 174-187 [doi]
- Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random NetworksDimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis. 188-201 [doi]
- Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism DesignDimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis. 202-215 [doi]
- A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like CakesLaurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Lydia Tlilane. 216-229 [doi]
- Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket ParadoxTobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen. 230-231 [doi]
- Price of Anarchy for the N-Player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation FunctionsXinran He, David Kempe. 232-248 [doi]
- Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation GamesMartin Hoefer, Lisa Wagner. 249-262 [doi]
- Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable MatchingMoshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller, Ramamohan Paturi. 263-276 [doi]
- Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative GameStratis Ioannidis, Patrick Loiseau. 277-290 [doi]
- Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward AdvertisingWeihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin. 291-304 [doi]
- Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and CardinalityNitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam. 305-318 [doi]
- Mitigating Covert Compromises - A Game-Theoretic Model of Targeted and Non-Targeted Covert AttacksAron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags. 319-332 [doi]
- Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with PaymentsPinyan Lu, Lan Yu. 333-346 [doi]
- Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public ProjectsBrendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos. 347-360 [doi]
- Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness - (Abstract)Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni. 361-362 [doi]
- A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium ProblemFrédéric Meunier, Thomas Pradeau. 363-376 [doi]
- Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated PlayersHadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy. 377-390 [doi]
- Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution GamesMona Rahn, Guido Schäfer. 391-404 [doi]
- Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy ReviewsNick Arnosti, Daniel Russo. 405-420 [doi]
- The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation MatrixDaniela Sabán, Jay Sethuraman. 421 [doi]
- Vickrey Auctions for Irregular DistributionsBalasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 422-435 [doi]
- Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake CuttingYuan Tian. 436-437 [doi]