Abstract is missing.
- Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social ChoiceBen Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu. 3-16 [doi]
- Autobidding with ConstraintsGagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Aranyak Mehta. 17-30 [doi]
- Response Prediction for Low-Regret AgentsSaeed Alaei, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Mohammad Mahdian, Sadra Yazdanbod. 31-44 [doi]
- Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via PersuasionJerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner, Haifeng Xu. 45-56 [doi]
- Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected PiecesEshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Siddharth Barman, Rachitesh Kumar, Nidhi Rathi. 57-70 [doi]
- A New Approach to Fair Distribution of WelfareMoshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige. 71-84 [doi]
- From Darwin to Poincaré and von Neumann: Recurrence and Cycles in Evolutionary and Algorithmic Game TheoryVictor Boone, Georgios Piliouras. 85-99 [doi]
- On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal MatchingsFelix Brandt 0001, Anaëlle Wilczynski. 100-113 [doi]
- Hotelling Games with Random Tolerance IntervalsAvi Cohen, David Peleg. 114-128 [doi]
- Mix and Match: Markov Chains and Mixing Times for Matching in RideshareMichael Curry, John P. Dickerson, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Aravind Srinivasan, Yuhao Wan, Pan Xu 0001. 129-141 [doi]
- Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of DualityShaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg. 142-155 [doi]
- Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling SegregationHagen Echzell, Tobias Friedrich 0001, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Marcus Pappik, Friedrich Schöne, Fabian Sommer, David Stangl. 156-170 [doi]
- Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small DomainsDiodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre. 171-185 [doi]
- The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism DesignAris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Philip Lazos. 186-199 [doi]
- On the Price of Anarchy of Cost-Sharing in Real-Time Scheduling SystemsEirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias. 200-213 [doi]
- The Classes PPA-k: Existence from Arguments Modulo kAlexandros Hollender. 214-227 [doi]
- On the Approximability of Simple Mechanisms for MHR DistributionsYaonan Jin, Weian Li, Qi Qi. 228-240 [doi]
- Topological Price of Anarchy Bounds for Clustering Games on NetworksPieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer. 241-255 [doi]
- Outsourcing Computation: The Minimal Refereed MechanismYuqing Kong, Chris Peikert, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao. 256-270 [doi]
- On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter AuctionsEvangelos Markakis, Artem Tsikiridis. 271-285 [doi]
- Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority ListsMarc Schröder 0002, Tami Tamir, Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi. 286-300 [doi]
- Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform MarketsZhenzhe Zheng, R. Srikant 0001. 301-315 [doi]
- On the Price of Anarchy for High-Price LinksCarme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué. 316-329 [doi]
- Competition in Ride-Hailing MarketsAmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, Nolan Skochdopole, Kane Sweeney. 333 [doi]
- Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric ApproachJerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink. 334 [doi]
- Scrip Systems with Minimal AvailabilityItai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov. 335 [doi]
- The Capacity Constrained Facility Location ProblemHaris Aziz 0001, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes. 336 [doi]
- The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the DemandRoberto Cominetti, Valerio Dose, Marco Scarsini. 337 [doi]
- The Value of Personalized PricingAdam N. Elmachtoub, Vishal Gupta, Michael L. Hamilton. 338 [doi]
- Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's MenuHans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada. 339 [doi]
- Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief UtilitiesAshish Goel, Reyna Hulett, Benjamin Plaut. 340 [doi]
- Capacity and Price Competition in Markets with Congestion EffectsTobias Harks, Anja Schedel. 341 [doi]
- Equality of Power and Fair Public Decision-MakingNicole Immorlica, Benjamin Plaut, E. Glen Weyl. 342 [doi]
- How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic DeparturesThomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi. 343 [doi]
- Almost Quasi-linear Utilities in Disguise: Positive-Representation an Extension of Roberts' TheoremIlan Nehama. 344-345 [doi]
- Information Design in Spatial Resource CompetitionPu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier. 346 [doi]