Abstract is missing.
- Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect RationalityDiodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre. 3-21 [doi]
- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential TrialsShih-Tang Su, Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck. 22-40 [doi]
- The Optimality of Upgrade PricingDirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin. 41-58 [doi]
- On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism DesignMeryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg. 59-75 [doi]
- Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue LossVincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng 0004, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka. 76-94 [doi]
- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable InstancesDimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos. 95-112 [doi]
- Contract Design for Afforestation ProgramsWanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier. 113-130 [doi]
- Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite MatchingIoannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu, Zihe Wang 0001. 131-148 [doi]
- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and FairnessGeorgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. 149-166 [doi]
- On the Benefits of Being Constrained When Receiving SignalsShih-Tang Su, David Kempe 0001, Vijay G. Subramanian. 167-185 [doi]
- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price AuctionEvangelos Markakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Artem Tsikiridis. 186-204 [doi]
- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order ModelBilly Jin, David P. Williamson. 207-225 [doi]
- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case AnalysisMoshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan. 226-243 [doi]
- The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent's Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up Your Home?Ildikó Schlotter, Péter Biró, Tamás Fleiner. 244-261 [doi]
- Mechanisms for Trading Durable GoodsSigal Oren, Oren Roth. 262-279 [doi]
- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary ProblemMaryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla 0001, S. Matthew Weinberg. 280-298 [doi]
- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of AnarchySiddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe 0001, Robert Kleinberg. 299-316 [doi]
- The Platform Design ProblemChristos Harilaos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli, Mihalis Yannakakis. 317-333 [doi]
- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market EquilibriaDenizalp Goktas, Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Amy Greenwald. 334-351 [doi]
- A Tight Negative Example for MMS Fair AllocationsUriel Feige, Ariel Sapir, Laliv Tauber. 355-372 [doi]
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive ValuationsSiddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma. 373-390 [doi]
- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing ProblemPál András Papp, Roger Wattenhofer. 391-409 [doi]
- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection BiasSigal Oren, Nadav Sklar. 410-427 [doi]
- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness AssessmentMark York, Munther Dahleh, David C. Parkes. 428-445 [doi]
- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security Against Rational AdversaryZhaohua Chen 0001, Guang Yang. 449-466 [doi]
- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social ChoiceElliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 467-485 [doi]
- Maximal Information Propagation via LotteriesJing Chen, Bo Li 0037. 486-503 [doi]
- Envy-free Division of Multi-layered CakesAyumi Igarashi, Frédéric Meunier. 504-521 [doi]
- Computing Envy-Freeable Allocations with Limited SubsidiesIoannis Caragiannis, Stavros Ioannidis 0001. 522-539 [doi]
- Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable ResourcesVineet Goyal, Garud Iyengar, Rajan Udwani. 543 [doi]
- Dynamic Bipartite Matching Market with Arrivals and DeparturesNaonori Kakimura, Donghao Zhu. 544 [doi]
- Static Pricing for Multi-unit Prophet Inequalities (Extended Abstract)Shuchi Chawla 0001, Nikhil R. Devanur, Thodoris Lykouris. 545-546 [doi]
- Fairness Maximization Among Offline Agents in Online-Matching MarketsWill Ma, Pan Xu, Yifan Xu. 547 [doi]
- Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product RuleFlorian Brandl, Felix Brandt 0001, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker 0001, Warut Suksompong. 548 [doi]
- Screening with Limited Information: The Minimax Theorem and a Geometric ApproachZhi Chen, ZhenYu Hu, Ruiqin Wang. 549 [doi]
- Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IRIdo Feldman, Ron Lavi. 550 [doi]
- Throttling Equilibria in Auction MarketsXi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar. 551 [doi]
- Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Mixed-Integer VariablesTobias Harks, Julian Schwarz. 552 [doi]
- In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria, Jiaqi Lu. 553 [doi]
- Contest Design with Threshold ObjectivesEdith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg. 554 [doi]
- Confounding Equilibria for Platforms with Private Information on Promotion ValueYonatan Gur, Gregory Macnamara, Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Saban. 555 [doi]