Françoise Forges - researchr alias

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Viewing Publication 1 - 18 from 18

2022

Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the normFrançoise Forges, József Sákovics. ijgt, 51(3):589-605, 2022. [doi]

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing caseStéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges. geb, 134:242-263, 2022. [doi]

2021

Strategic information transmission with sender's approvalFrançoise Forges, Jérôme Renault. ijgt, 50(2):475-502, 2021. [doi]

2017

Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special IssueEhud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David Parkes, Jennifer Byrd. geb, 103:1-18, 2017. [doi]

2016

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian gamesFrançoise Forges, Ulrich Horst, Antoine Salomon. ijgt, 45(1-2):11-36, 2016. [doi]

2015

Bayesian repeated games and reputationAntoine Salomon, Françoise Forges. jet, 159:70-104, 2015. [doi]

2014

Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406]Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli. jet, 151:605-606, 2014. [doi]

2013

A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitmentFrançoise Forges. geb, 78:64-71, 2013. [doi]

Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open ProblemsFrançoise Forges, Roberto Serrano. igtr, 15(2), 2013. [doi]

2011

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private valuesOmer Biran, Françoise Forges. geb, 73(1):52-64, 2011. [doi]

2009

Afriat's theorem for general budget setsFrançoise Forges, Enrico Minelli. jet, 144(1):135-145, 2009. [doi]

2008

Long persuasion gamesFrançoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler. jet, 143(1):1-35, 2008. [doi]

Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable TypesFrédéric Koessler, Françoise Forges. igtr, 10(2):145-164, 2008. [doi]

2006

Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent EndowmentsFrançoise Forges. scw, 26(2):403-419, 2006. [doi]

2004

The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment gameFrançoise Forges. mss, 47(2):135-151, 2004. [doi]

2001

A Note on the Incentive Compatible CoreFrançoise Forges, Enrico Minelli. jet, 98(1):179-188, 2001. [doi]

1994

Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information TransmissionFrançoise Forges. BIRTHDAY 1994: 65-95 [doi]

1988

Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete InformationFrançoise Forges. mor, 13(2):191-231, 1988. [doi]

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