Steven J. Brams - researchr alias

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Viewing Publication 1 - 45 from 45

2022

Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is ImpossibleSteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler. orf, 3(2), 2022. [doi]

Obituary: Peter C. Fishburn (1936-2021)Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts. DAM, 310:109-110, 2022. [doi]

The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votesSteven J. Brams, Markus Brill, Anne-Marie George. scw, 58(2):283-300, 2022. [doi]

2021

Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and BlackSteven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail. cig 2021: 1-4 [doi]

Peter C. Fishburn (1936-2021)Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts. mss, 113:230-231, 2021. [doi]

Peter C. Fishburn (1936-2021)Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts. scw, 57(1):1-3, 2021. [doi]

2020

A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede GameSteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour. games, 11(3):35, 2020. [doi]

2018

Making the Rules of Sports FairerSteven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail. siamrev, 60(1):181-202, 2018. [doi]

Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More CompetitiveSteven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail, D. Marc Kilgour, Walter Stromquist. tamm, 125(9):771-796, 2018. [doi]

2013

Game Theory and PoliticsSteven J. Brams. Dover Books on Science, Dover Publications, 2013. [doi]

N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect DivisionSteven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler. tamm, 120(1):35-47, 2013. [doi]

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formationSteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour. scw, 41(1):1-18, 2013. [doi]

2012

The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible itemsSteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler. scw, 39(2-3):615-631, 2012. [doi]

On Maxsum Fair Cake DivisionsSteven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia. AAAI 2012: 1285-1291 [doi]

2011

Game Theory and the Humanities - Bridging Two WorldsSteven J. Brams. MIT Press, 2011. [doi]

Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting AlgorithmSteven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler. siamrev, 53(2):291-307, 2011. [doi]

Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargainingD. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams, Todd R. Kaplan. tark 2011: 170-176 [doi]

2010

A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a shareStergios Athanassoglou, Steven J. Brams, Jay Sethuraman. mss, 60(3):191-195, 2010. [doi]

2009

Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of CakeJulius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams, Walter Stromquist. tamm, 116(6):496-514, 2009. [doi]

Voting Systems that Combine Approval and PreferenceSteven J. Brams, M. Remzi Sanver. In Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts, editors, The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order. Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 215-237, Springer, 2009. [doi]

2008

Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division proceduresSteven J. Brams. mcm, 48(9-10):1666-1670, 2008. [doi]

The Presidential Election Game, 2nd editionSteven J. Brams. CRC Press, 2008.

Proportional pie-cuttingSteven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler. ijgt, 36(3-4):353-367, 2008. [doi]

2007

2005

Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval votingSteven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn. scw, 25(2-3):457-474, 2005. [doi]

2004

Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyondJulius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams. mss, 48(3):251-269, 2004. [doi]

2003

Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-upSteven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, D. Marc Kilgour. tark 2003: 187-200 [doi]

2002

Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?Walter Bossert, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour. geb, 40(2):185-202, 2002. [doi]

2001

A nail-biting electionSteven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn. scw, 18(3):409-414, 2001. [doi]

2000

The win-win solution - guaranteeing fair shares to everybodySteven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor. W. W. Norton & Company, 2000.

Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equitySteven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn. scw, 17(2):247-267, 2000. [doi]

1999

Agreement through Threats: the Northern Ireland CaseSteven J. Brams, Jeffrey M. Togman. igtr, 1(3-4):251-265, 1999. [doi]

1996

Fair division - from cake-cutting to dispute resolutionSteven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

1995

On Envy-Free Cake DivisionSteven J. Brams. JCT, 70(1):170-173, 1995.

1988

Game Theory and National SecuritySteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour. Wiley, 1988. [doi]

1987

Optimal ThreatsSteven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour. ior, 35(4):524-536, 1987. [doi]

1982

Optimal resource allocation in presidential primariesSteven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis. mss, 3(4):373-388, 1982. [doi]

1980

Letter to the Editor - Authors' RejoinderSteven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis. ior, 28(4):1024-1025, 1980. [doi]

1978

Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory ChallengesSteven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis. ior, 26(6):966-991, 1978. [doi]

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