M. Remzi Sanver - researchr alias

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Viewing Publication 1 - 40 from 40

2022

Approval with RunoffThéo Delemazure, Jérôme Lang, Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver. IJCAI 2022: 230-236 [doi]

Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential electionsUmut Keskin, M. Remzi Sanver, H. Berkay Tosunlu. scw, 59(2):305-333, 2022. [doi]

2021

Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rulesUmut Keskin, M. Remzi Sanver, H. Berkay Tosunlu. scw, 56(1):125-141, 2021. [doi]

An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluationJustin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 57(3):535-555, 2021. [doi]

The relationship between Arrow's and Wilson's theorems on restricted domainsJustin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver. mss, 114:95-97, 2021. [doi]

A solution to the two-person implementation problemJean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver. jet, 194:105261, 2021. [doi]

On the subgame perfect implementabılıty of voting rulesMatías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 56(2):421-441, 2021. [doi]

Correction to: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisitedAli Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 57(1):115, 2021. [doi]

Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisitedAli Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 57(1):97-113, 2021. [doi]

2020

Metrizable preferences over preferencesGilbert Laffond, Jean Lainé, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 55(1):177-191, 2020. [doi]

2018

Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibilityJustin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver. mss, 94:32-34, 2018. [doi]

Restricting the domain allows for weaker independenceJustin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 51(3):563-575, 2018. [doi]

2017

Evaluationwise strategy-proofnessBora Erdamar, M. Remzi Sanver, Shin Sato. geb, 106:227-238, 2017. [doi]

Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicityMatías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver. mss, 90:9-17, 2017. [doi]

2015

Voting games of resolute social choice correspondencesSinan Ertemel, Levent Kutlu, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 45(1):187-201, 2015. [doi]

2014

Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independenceCeyhun Coban, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 43(4):953-961, 2014. [doi]

Measuring consensus in a preference-approval contextBora Erdamar, José Luis García-Lapresta, David Pérez-Román, M. Remzi Sanver. inffus, 17:14-21, 2014. [doi]

2013

On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functionsShurojit Chatterji, M. Remzi Sanver, Arunava Sen. jet, 148(3):1050-1073, 2013. [doi]

2012

On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternativesFuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver, Vyacheslav Yakuba. mss, 64(1):67-73, 2012. [doi]

Computation and Incentives in Social Choice (Dagstuhl Seminar 12101)Edith Elkind, Christian Klamler, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, M. Remzi Sanver. dagstuhl-reports, 2(3):1-22, 2012. [doi]

Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rulesM. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker. scw, 39(2-3):371-398, 2012. [doi]

2009

Voting Systems that Combine Approval and PreferenceSteven J. Brams, M. Remzi Sanver. In Steven J. Brams, William V. Gehrlein, Fred S. Roberts, editors, The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order. Studies in Choice and Welfare, pages 215-237, Springer, 2009. [doi]

Stereotype formation as trait aggregationBurak Can, M. Remzi Sanver. mss, 58(2):226-237, 2009. [doi]

Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approachM. Remzi Sanver. scw, 33(1):159-171, 2009. [doi]

Sophisticated preference aggregationM. Remzi Sanver, Özer Selçuk. scw, 33(1):73-86, 2009. [doi]

One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofnessM. Remzi Sanver, William S. Zwicker. ijgt, 38(4):553-574, 2009. [doi]

A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctionsSelçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver. geb, 66(2):880-892, 2009. [doi]

2008

Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomesEmre Dogan, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 30(3):495-506, 2008. [doi]

Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondencesSelçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 30(1):89-101, 2008. [doi]

2007

On combining implementable social choice rulesJean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok, M. Remzi Sanver. geb, 60(1):20-30, 2007. [doi]

Dictatorial domains in preference aggregationUgur Ozdemir, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 28(1):61-76, 2007. [doi]

A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functionsM. Remzi Sanver. mss, 54(3):257-260, 2007. [doi]

Is abstention an escape from Arrow's theorem?Murat Ali Çengelci, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 28(3):439-442, 2007. [doi]

2006

Nash implementation via hyperfunctionsIpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 26(3):607-623, 2006. [doi]

Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum VotingIpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 27(1):211-219, 2006. [doi]

2005

Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rulesOrhan Erdem, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 25(1):31-42, 2005. [doi]

Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanismsIpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver. mss, 50(3):304-317, 2005. [doi]

2004

Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winnersMurat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 22(2):331-347, 2004. [doi]

2003

Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winnersBaris Kaymak, M. Remzi Sanver. scw, 20(3):477-494, 2003. [doi]

2002

Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneouslyM. Remzi Sanver. mss, 43(2):151-155, 2002. [doi]

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