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Adrian Vetta
Dimitris Fotakis
Edith Elkind
Elliot Anshelevich
Evangelos Markakis
Felix Brandt
George Christodoulou 0001
Guido Schäfer
Ioannis Caragiannis
Jugal Garg
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
Marios Mavronicolas
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Michal Feldman
Paul G. Spirakis
Paul W. Goldberg
Piotr Faliszewski
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Vittorio Bilò
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algorithmic
anarchy
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SAGT (sagt)
Editions
Publications
Viewing Publication 1 - 100 from 442
2023
EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approach
Yusuke Kobayashi 0001
,
Ryoga Mahara
,
Souta Sakamoto
.
sagt 2023
:
257-270
[doi]
Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games
Tobias Friedrich 0001
,
Pascal Lenzner
,
Louise Molitor
,
Lars Seifert
.
sagt 2023
:
111-126
[doi]
Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting
Haris Aziz 0001
,
Sujit Gujar
,
Manisha Padala
,
Mashbat Suzuki
,
Jeremy Vollen
.
sagt 2023
:
142-160
[doi]
Computational Complexity of k-Stable Matchings
Haris Aziz 0001
,
Gergely Csáji
,
Ágnes Cseh
.
sagt 2023
:
311-328
[doi]
Threshold Mechanisms for Dynamic Procurement with Abandonment
Ali Khodabakhsh 0002
,
Evdokia Nikolova
,
Emmanouil Pountourakis
,
Jimmy Horn
.
sagt 2023
:
383-400
[doi]
The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few Agent Types
Umang Bhaskar
,
Neeldhara Misra
,
Aditi Sethia
,
Rohit Vaish
.
sagt 2023
:
271-289
[doi]
Computational Complexity of Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Multi-player Games
Vittorio Bilò
,
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
,
Marios Mavronicolas
.
sagt 2023
:
40-57
[doi]
Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and Experiments
Niclas Boehmer
,
Piotr Faliszewski
,
Lukasz Janeczko
,
Andrzej Kaczmarczyk 0001
.
sagt 2023
:
161-178
[doi]
Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Under Cost Utilities
Sirin Botan
,
Angus Ritossa
,
Mashbat Suzuki
,
Toby Walsh
.
sagt 2023
:
221-238
[doi]
Optimizing over Serial Dictatorships
Ioannis Caragiannis
,
Nidhi Rathi
.
sagt 2023
:
329-346
[doi]
Repeatedly Matching Items to Agents Fairly and Efficiently
Ioannis Caragiannis
,
Shivika Narang
.
sagt 2023
:
347-364
[doi]
Into the Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to Papers with Uncertain Affinities
Cyrus Cousins
,
Justin Payan
,
Yair Zick
.
sagt 2023
:
179-197
[doi]
Algorithmic Game Theory - 16th International Symposium, SAGT 2023, Egham, UK, September 4-7, 2023, Proceedings
Argyrios Deligkas
,
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
, editors,
Volume 14238 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, Springer,
2023.
[doi]
Stackelberg Vertex Cover on a Path
Katharina Eickhoff
,
Lennart Kauther
,
Britta Peis
.
sagt 2023
:
22-39
[doi]
Parameterized Complexity of Gerrymandering
Andrew Fraser
,
Brian Lavallee
,
Blair D. Sullivan
.
sagt 2023
:
127-141
[doi]
Arbitrary Profit Sharing in Federated Learning Utility Games
Eirini Georgoulaki
,
Kostas Kollias
.
sagt 2023
:
58-70
[doi]
The Frontier of Intractability for EFX with Two Agents
Paul W. Goldberg
,
Kasper Høgh
,
Alexandros Hollender
.
sagt 2023
:
290-307
[doi]
Truthful Two-Facility Location with Candidate Locations
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
,
Alexandros A. Voudouris
,
Rongsen Zhang
.
sagt 2023
:
365-382
[doi]
Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on Networks
Stanislaw Kazmierowski
,
Marcin Dziubinski
.
sagt 2023
:
3-21
[doi]
The Contest Game for Crowdsourcing Reviews
Marios Mavronicolas
,
Paul G. Spirakis
.
sagt 2023
:
71-89
[doi]
Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in Networks
Lata Narayanan
,
Yasaman Sabbagh
.
sagt 2023
:
198-217
[doi]
Fair Algorithm Design: Fair and Efficacious Machine Scheduling
April Niu
,
Agnes Totschnig
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2023
:
239-256
[doi]
Entrepreneurship Facility-Activation Games
Shaul Rosner
,
Tami Tamir
.
sagt 2023
:
90-108
[doi]
Strategy-Proof Budgeting via a VCG-Like Mechanism
Jonathan Wagner
,
Reshef Meir
.
sagt 2023
:
401-418
[doi]
2022
Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games
Martin Hoefer 0001
,
Lisa Wilhelmi
.
sagt 2022
:
187-204
[doi]
On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games
Yichen Yang 0008
,
Kai Jia
,
Martin C. Rinard
.
sagt 2022
:
311-328
[doi]
Decentralized Update Selection with Semi-strategic Experts
Georgios Amanatidis
,
Georgios Birmpas
,
Philip Lazos
,
Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío
.
sagt 2022
:
403-420
[doi]
Fair Ride Allocation on a Line
Yuki Amano
,
Ayumi Igarashi
,
Yasushi Kawase
,
Kazuhisa Makino
,
Hirotaka Ono
.
sagt 2022
:
421-435
[doi]
Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals Can Be Harder Than Strict Preferences
Matthias Bentert
,
Niclas Boehmer
,
Klaus Heeger
,
Tomohiro Koana
.
sagt 2022
:
436-453
[doi]
How Bad is the Merger Paradox?
Liad Blumrosen
,
Yehonatan Mizrahi
.
sagt 2022
:
23-40
[doi]
Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism
Ruben Brokkelkamp
,
Sjir Hoeijmakers
,
Guido Schäfer
.
sagt 2022
:
41-59
[doi]
Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts
Alon Cohen
,
Argyrios Deligkas
,
Moran Koren
.
sagt 2022
:
331-346
[doi]
An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games
Jack Dippel
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2022
:
241-257
[doi]
Collective Schedules: Axioms and Algorithms
Martin Durand
,
Fanny Pascual
.
sagt 2022
:
454-471
[doi]
Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment
Edith Elkind
,
Sonja Kraiczy
,
Nicholas Teh
.
sagt 2022
:
490-507
[doi]
Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy
Edith Elkind
,
Abheek Ghosh
,
Paul W. Goldberg
.
sagt 2022
:
133-150
[doi]
Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting
Edith Elkind
,
Piotr Faliszewski
,
Ayumi Igarashi
,
Pasin Manurangsi
,
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
,
Warut Suksompong
.
sagt 2022
:
472-489
[doi]
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling
Michal Feldman
,
Nick Gravin
,
Zhihao Gavin Tang
,
Almog Wald
.
sagt 2022
:
60-77
[doi]
Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs
Matan Gilboa
,
Noam Nisan
.
sagt 2022
:
151-168
[doi]
PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games
Paul W. Goldberg
,
Matthew J. Katzman
.
sagt 2022
:
169-186
[doi]
Coopetition Against an Amazon
Ronen Gradwohl
,
Moshe Tennenholtz
.
sagt 2022
:
347-365
[doi]
Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-modal Preferences
Sushmita Gupta
,
Pallavi Jain 0001
,
Daniel Lokshtanov
,
Sanjukta Roy
,
Saket Saurabh 0001
.
sagt 2022
:
508-525
[doi]
Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities
Stavros D. Ioannidis
,
Bart de Keijzer
,
Carmine Ventre
.
sagt 2022
:
205-222
[doi]
Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2˟ 2˟ 2 Games
Sahar Jahani
,
Bernhard von Stengel
.
sagt 2022
:
223-237
[doi]
Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Colchester, UK, September 12-15, 2022, Proceedings
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
,
Maria Kyropoulou
,
Alexandros A. Voudouris
, editors,
Volume 13584 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, Springer,
2022.
[doi]
Online Max-min Fair Allocation
Yasushi Kawase
,
Hanna Sumita
.
sagt 2022
:
526-543
[doi]
Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems
Aggelos Kiayias
.
sagt 2022
:
3-19
[doi]
A Common Generalization of Budget Games and Congestion Games
Fuga Kiyosue
,
Kenjiro Takazawa
.
sagt 2022
:
258-274
[doi]
Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents
Sophie Klumper
,
Guido Schäfer
.
sagt 2022
:
78-93
[doi]
Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas
Kazuhisa Makino
,
Shuichi Miyazaki
,
Yu Yokoi
.
sagt 2022
:
544-561
[doi]
On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets
Evangelos Markakis
,
Georgios Papasotiropoulos
,
Artem Tsikiridis
.
sagt 2022
:
94-112
[doi]
Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions
Reshef Meir
,
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
.
sagt 2022
:
113-130
[doi]
Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games
Georgios Piliouras
,
Lillian J. Ratliff
,
Ryann Sim
,
Stratis Skoulakis
.
sagt 2022
:
383-399
[doi]
Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities
Shaul Rosner
,
Tami Tamir
.
sagt 2022
:
275-292
[doi]
Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams
Leora Schmerler
,
Noam Hazon
,
Sarit Kraus
.
sagt 2022
:
562-579
[doi]
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents
Roy Shahmoon
,
Rann Smorodinsky
,
Moshe Tennenholtz
.
sagt 2022
:
366-382
[doi]
On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games
Qian Wang
.
sagt 2022
:
293-310
[doi]
2021
On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching
Jiehua Chen 0001
,
Adrian Chmurovic
,
Fabian Jogl
,
Manuel Sorge
.
sagt 2021
:
205-220
[doi]
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
Mete Seref Ahunbay
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2021
:
3-17
[doi]
The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions
Mete Seref Ahunbay
,
Brendan Lucier
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2021
:
18-33
[doi]
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation
Ameer Amer
,
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
.
sagt 2021
:
34-48
[doi]
Metric-Distortion Bounds Under Limited Information
Ioannis Anagnostides
,
Dimitris Fotakis
,
Panagiotis Patsilinakos
.
sagt 2021
:
299-313
[doi]
On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools
Burak Can
,
Jens Leth Hougaard
,
Mohsen Pourpouneh
.
sagt 2021
:
409
[doi]
Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Aarhus, Denmark, September 21-24, 2021, Proceedings
Ioannis Caragiannis
,
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
, editors,
Volume 12885 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, Springer,
2021.
[doi]
Hedonic Expertise Games
Bugra Caskurlu
,
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya
,
Berkehan Ozen
.
sagt 2021
:
314-328
[doi]
On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap
Chandra Chekuri
,
Vasilis Livanos
.
sagt 2021
:
410
[doi]
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Zhaohua Chen
,
Xiaotie Deng
,
Wenhan Huang
,
Hanyu Li
,
Yuhao Li 0002
.
sagt 2021
:
97-111
[doi]
Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets
José R. Correa
,
Dana Pizarro
,
Victor Verdugo
.
sagt 2021
:
221-235
[doi]
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Tomer Ezra
,
Michal Feldman
,
Ron Kupfer
.
sagt 2021
:
112-123
[doi]
Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location
Aris Filos-Ratsikas
,
Alexandros A. Voudouris
.
sagt 2021
:
49-63
[doi]
When Dividing Mixed Manna Is Easier Than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores
Jugal Garg
,
Martin Hoefer 0001
,
Peter McGlaughlin
,
Marco Schmalhofer
.
sagt 2021
:
329-344
[doi]
Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values
Jugal Garg
,
Aniket Murhekar
.
sagt 2021
:
345-359
[doi]
Vote Delegation and Misbehavior
Hans Gersbach
,
Akaki Mamageishvili
,
Manvir Schneider
.
sagt 2021
:
411
[doi]
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget
Amin Ghiasi
,
Masoud Seddighin
.
sagt 2021
:
236-250
[doi]
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
Vasilis Gkatzelis
,
Rishi Patel
,
Emmanouil Pountourakis
,
Daniel Schoepflin 0001
.
sagt 2021
:
64-78
[doi]
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games
Paul W. Goldberg
,
Matthew J. Katzman
.
sagt 2021
:
124-139
[doi]
Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets
Sreenivas Gollapudi
,
Kostas Kollias
,
Ali Shameli
.
sagt 2021
:
251-265
[doi]
Gerrymandering on Graphs: Computational Complexity and Parameterized Algorithms
Sushmita Gupta
,
Pallavi Jain 0001
,
Fahad Panolan
,
Sanjukta Roy
,
Saket Saurabh 0001
.
sagt 2021
:
140-155
[doi]
Game Theory on the Blockchain: A Model for Games with Smart Contracts
Mathias Hall-Andersen
,
Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach
.
sagt 2021
:
156-170
[doi]
On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games
Jochen Könemann
,
Justin Toth
,
Felix Zhou
.
sagt 2021
:
171-185
[doi]
An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy
Evangelos Markakis
,
Georgios Papasotiropoulos
.
sagt 2021
:
360-375
[doi]
The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences
Michael McKay
,
David F. Manlove
.
sagt 2021
:
266-280
[doi]
Two Birds with One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers
Vishnu V. Narayan
,
Mashbat Suzuki
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2021
:
376-390
[doi]
Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How Many Strategic Agents Are Required to Turn Pessimality to Optimality?
Ndiamé Ndiaye
,
Sergey Norin
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2021
:
281-295
[doi]
Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures
Julian Nickerl
,
Jacobo Torán
.
sagt 2021
:
186-201
[doi]
Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees
Jonathan A. Noel
,
Mashbat Suzuki
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2021
:
391-405
[doi]
Efficiency of Equilibria in Games with Random Payoffs
Matteo Quattropani
,
Marco Scarsini
.
sagt 2021
:
412
[doi]
Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection
Xiuzhen Zhang
,
Yao Zhang
,
Dengji Zhao
.
sagt 2021
:
79-93
[doi]
2020
Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games with Altruistic/Spiteful Players
Marc Schröder 0002
.
sagt 2020
:
146-159
[doi]
Asymptotically Optimal Communication in Simple Mechanisms
Ioannis Anagnostides
,
Dimitris Fotakis
,
Panagiotis Patsilinakos
.
sagt 2020
:
17-31
[doi]
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up
Nawal Benabbou
,
Mithun Chakraborty
,
Ayumi Igarashi
,
Yair Zick
.
sagt 2020
:
32-46
[doi]
Congestion Games with Priority-Based Scheduling
Vittorio Bilò
,
Cosimo Vinci
.
sagt 2020
:
67-82
[doi]
Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
Giannis Fikioris
,
Dimitris Fotakis
.
sagt 2020
:
47-63
[doi]
Algorithmic Game Theory - 13th International Symposium, SAGT 2020, Augsburg, Germany, September 16-18, 2020, Proceedings
Tobias Harks
,
Max Klimm
, editors,
Volume 12283 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, Springer,
2020.
[doi]
The Impact of Spillback on the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time
Jonas Israel
,
Leon Sering
.
sagt 2020
:
114-129
[doi]
Modified Schelling Games
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
,
Maria Kyropoulou
,
Alexandros A. Voudouris
.
sagt 2020
:
241-256
[doi]
Envy-Freeness and Relaxed Stability: Hardness and Approximation Algorithms
Prem Krishnaa
,
Girija Limaye
,
Meghana Nasre
,
Prajakta Nimbhorkar
.
sagt 2020
:
193-208
[doi]
Dynamic Equilibria in Time-Varying Networks
Hoang Minh Pham
,
Leon Sering
.
sagt 2020
:
130-145
[doi]
Race Scheduling Games
Shaul Rosner
,
Tami Tamir
.
sagt 2020
:
257-272
[doi]
How Many Freemasons Are There? The Consensus Voting Mechanism in Metric Spaces
Mashbat Suzuki
,
Adrian Vetta
.
sagt 2020
:
322-336
[doi]
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