| 1 | -- | 14 | Yakov Babichenko. Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria |
| 15 | -- | 25 | Roberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza, Esther Hauk. Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement |
| 26 | -- | 43 | Timothy N. Cason, Roman M. Sheremeta, Jingjing Zhang. Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games |
| 44 | -- | 73 | Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian J. Goerg, Reinhard Selten. Learning in experimental 2×2 games |
| 74 | -- | 87 | Songzi Du. Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play |
| 88 | -- | 96 | Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper. Unbeatable imitation |
| 97 | -- | 116 | John Duffy, Jack Ochs. Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games |
| 117 | -- | 130 | Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, Sara Munkhammar. Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? |
| 131 | -- | 159 | Wedad Elmaghraby, Nathan Larson. Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs |
| 160 | -- | 180 | Arantza Estévez-Fernández. New characterizations for largeness of the core |
| 181 | -- | 194 | Emel Filiz-Ozbay. Incorporating unawareness into contract theory |
| 195 | -- | 209 | Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser, Jean-Robert Tyran. Competition fosters trust |
| 210 | -- | 225 | Ali Jadbabaie, Pooya Molavi, Alvaro Sandroni, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Non-Bayesian social learning |
| 226 | -- | 248 | René Kirkegaard. Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps |
| 249 | -- | 271 | Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn. Political competition between differentiated candidates |
| 272 | -- | 284 | Priscilla T. Y. Man. Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games |
| 285 | -- | 300 | Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy. Strategy-proof partitioning |
| 301 | -- | 328 | Philip R. Neary. Competing conventions |
| 329 | -- | 339 | Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu, Nicholas C. Yannelis. Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium |
| 340 | -- | 343 | Juha Tolvanen, Elefterios Soultanis. A correction to "Large games and the law of large numbers" [Games Econom. Behav. 64(2008) 1-34] |
| 344 | -- | 348 | René van den Brink. Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks |
| 349 | -- | 353 | Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong. Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter |