Journal: Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 76, Issue 2

355 -- 374Hassan Benchekroun, Cees Withagen. On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game
375 -- 390Yuval Heller. Justifiable choice
391 -- 419T. Renee Bowen, Zaki Zahran. On dynamic compromise
420 -- 438David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Smooth multibidding mechanisms
439 -- 456Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren. Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
457 -- 470Thomas Buser. Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences
471 -- 494Franz Dietrich. Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework
495 -- 514Nejat Anbarci, Nick Feltovich. Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
515 -- 518Stefano Colombo. A comment on "welfare reducing licensing"
519 -- 534Prajit K. Dutta. Coordination need not be a problem
535 -- 547Stefan Terstiege. Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
548 -- 555Huan Xie, Yong-Ju Lee. Social norms and trust among strangers
556 -- 570Andrea Collevecchio, Marco LiCalzi. The probability of nontrivial common knowledge
571 -- 581Bo Chen, Satoru Takahashi. A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
582 -- 595Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique. When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?
596 -- 610Kang Rong. Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration
611 -- 635Kirill Chernomaz, Dan Levin. Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
636 -- 647Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta. Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
648 -- 664Charles Z. Zheng. Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
665 -- 677Miguel A. Hinojosa, Eulalia Romero, José Manuel Zarzuelo. Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value
678 -- 689Dirk Engelmann, Martin Strobel. Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
690 -- 710Kirill Chernomaz. On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
711 -- 737Marie Laclau. A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
738 -- 752Penélope Hernández, Amparo Urbano, José E. Vila. Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
753 -- 772David Martimort, Lars Stole. Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency

Volume 76, Issue 1

1 -- 14Yakov Babichenko. Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
15 -- 25Roberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza, Esther Hauk. Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
26 -- 43Timothy N. Cason, Roman M. Sheremeta, Jingjing Zhang. Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
44 -- 73Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian J. Goerg, Reinhard Selten. Learning in experimental 2×2 games
74 -- 87Songzi Du. Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
88 -- 96Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper. Unbeatable imitation
97 -- 116John Duffy, Jack Ochs. Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
117 -- 130Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, Sara Munkhammar. Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
131 -- 159Wedad Elmaghraby, Nathan Larson. Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
160 -- 180Arantza Estévez-Fernández. New characterizations for largeness of the core
181 -- 194Emel Filiz-Ozbay. Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
195 -- 209Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lünser, Jean-Robert Tyran. Competition fosters trust
210 -- 225Ali Jadbabaie, Pooya Molavi, Alvaro Sandroni, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. Non-Bayesian social learning
226 -- 248René Kirkegaard. Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
249 -- 271Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn. Political competition between differentiated candidates
272 -- 284Priscilla T. Y. Man. Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
285 -- 300Debasis Mishra, Souvik Roy. Strategy-proof partitioning
301 -- 328Philip R. Neary. Competing conventions
329 -- 339Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu, Nicholas C. Yannelis. Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
340 -- 343Juha Tolvanen, Elefterios Soultanis. A correction to "Large games and the law of large numbers" [Games Econom. Behav. 64(2008) 1-34]
344 -- 348René van den Brink. Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
349 -- 353Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong. Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter