Journal: J. Economic Theory

Volume 102, Issue 2

251 -- 289Paolo Ghirardato, Massimo Marinacci. Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation
290 -- 321S. Rao Aiyagari, Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri. Efficient Investment in Children
322 -- 353Peter Norman. Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation
354 -- 374Stéphane Gauthier. Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria
375 -- 402Thomas Tröger. Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach
403 -- 420F. Kübler, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Ivar Ekeland, Heracles M. Polemarchakis. The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices under Uncertainty
421 -- 436Jean-Pierre Benoît. Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted
437 -- 470Erik J. Balder. A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results
471 -- 479Luís M. B. Cabral. Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect
480 -- 484Alejandro M. Manelli. Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games

Volume 102, Issue 1

1 -- 15Michihiro Kandori. Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
16 -- 39V. Bhaskar, Eric van Damme. Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring
40 -- 69V. Bhaskar, Ichiro Obara. Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
70 -- 83Michele Piccione. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
84 -- 105Jeffrey C. Ely, Juuso Välimäki. A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma
106 -- 150Olivier Compte. On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations
151 -- 188Olivier Compte. On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private
189 -- 228George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris. Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
229 -- 248Masaki Aoyagi. Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication