Journal: J. Economic Theory

Volume 114, Issue 2

179 -- 197Colin M. Campbell. Blackwell's ordering and public information
198 -- 230Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Martin Uribe. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices
231 -- 254Juan Delgado, Diego Moreno. Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly
255 -- 279Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal. Local coordination and market equilibria
280 -- 309Jason Shachat, Mark Walker. Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games
310 -- 328Assaf Ben-Shoham, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij. The evolution of exchange
329 -- 344Pablo F. Beker. Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market?
345 -- 357Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Paulo K. Monteiro, Rabee Tourky. Non-marketed options, non-existence of equilibria, and non-linear prices
358 -- 369Lars Ehlers. Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
370 -- 371Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo Hopenhayn. Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169]

Volume 114, Issue 1

1 -- 30Andrea Moro 0002, Peter Norman. A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination
31 -- 55Dana Heller. An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment
56 -- 87Igal Milchtaich. Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games
88 -- 103Rohan Pitchford, Christopher M. Snyder. A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment
104 -- 131Dino Gerardi. Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information
132 -- 152Archishman Chakraborty, Bilge Yilmaz. Informed manipulation
153 -- 169Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo Hopenhayn. Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
170 -- 177Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction