| 353 | -- | 362 | Özgür Kibris. Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis |
| 363 | -- | 370 | Antonio Quesada. Positional independence in preference aggregation |
| 371 | -- | 385 | Szilvia Pápai. Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices |
| 387 | -- | 403 | Vincent C. H. Chua, H. C. Huang. The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games |
| 405 | -- | 428 | Gaël Giraud, Céline Rochon. Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies |
| 429 | -- | 441 | Drora Karotkin, Jacob Paroush. Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma |
| 443 | -- | 456 | Yew-Kwang Ng, Guang-Zhen Sun, Guang-Zhen Sun. Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: An impossibility and some proposals |
| 457 | -- | 465 | Fabio Maccheroni, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Massimo Marinacci. How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations |
| 467 | -- | 475 | Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey, Mathias Risse. Flipping and ex post aggregation |
| 477 | -- | 494 | Baris Kaymak, M. Remzi Sanver. Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners |
| 495 | -- | 507 | Semih Koray, Bulent Unel. Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain |
| 509 | -- | 522 | Marco A. Haan, Peter Kooreman. How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox |
| 523 | -- | 528 | Gerhard J. Woeginger. Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize |