A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff

Jakub Dargaj, Jakob Grue Simonsen. A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff. In Péter Biró, Jason Hartline, Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel D. Procaccia, editors, EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020. pages 69-70, ACM, 2020. [doi]

Authors

Jakub Dargaj

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Jakob Grue Simonsen

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