A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff

Jakub Dargaj, Jakob Grue Simonsen. A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff. In Péter Biró, Jason Hartline, Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel D. Procaccia, editors, EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020. pages 69-70, ACM, 2020. [doi]

@inproceedings{DargajS20,
  title = {A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff},
  author = {Jakub Dargaj and Jakob Grue Simonsen},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.1145/3391403.3399520},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399520},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/DargajS20},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {69-70},
  booktitle = {EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020},
  editor = {Péter Biró and Jason Hartline and Michael Ostrovsky and Ariel D. Procaccia},
  publisher = {ACM},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-7975-5},
}