Abstract is missing.
- Information asymmetries in pay-per-bid auctionsJohn W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas. 1-12 [doi]
- Auctions with online supplyMoshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron Roth. 13-22 [doi]
- Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstractJon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Mallesh M. Pai. 23-32 [doi]
- Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projectsDavid Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer. 33-42 [doi]
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computationMoshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 43-52 [doi]
- Composition of markets with conflicting incentivesStanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami. 53-62 [doi]
- Computing pure strategy nash equilibria in compact symmetric gamesChristopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 63-72 [doi]
- Approximating pure nash equilibrium in cut, party affiliation, and satisfiability gamesAnand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna. 73-82 [doi]
- Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form gamesJoshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer. 83-92 [doi]
- Congestible services and network effectsRamesh Johari, Sunil Kumar. 93-94 [doi]
- Innovation, openness & platform controlGeoffrey Parker, Marshall W. van Alstyne. 95-96 [doi]
- Market design & analysis for a P2P backup systemSven Seuken, Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri. 97-108 [doi]
- Optimal online assignment with forecastsErik Vee, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram. 109-118 [doi]
- Matching in networks with bilateral contracts: extended abstractJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers. 119-120 [doi]
- Fast algorithms for finding matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs with applications to display adsDenis Charles, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Manan Sanghi. 121-128 [doi]
- Revenue maximization with a single samplePeerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan. 129-138 [doi]
- Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellersMukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan. 139-148 [doi]
- The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism designShuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan. 149-158 [doi]
- Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstractEdith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky. 159-166 [doi]
- Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract)Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira. 167-178 [doi]
- Better vaccination strategies for better peoplePo-An Chen, Mary David, David Kempe. 179-188 [doi]
- A new understanding of prediction markets via no-regret learningYiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 189-198 [doi]
- Information aggregation in smooth marketsKrishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi. 199-206 [doi]
- Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets: effects of trading mechanism and information distributionLian Jian, Rahul Sami. 207-208 [doi]
- The labor economics of paid crowdsourcingJohn Joseph Horton, Lydia B. Chilton. 209-218 [doi]
- Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation systemDarius Braziunas, Craig Boutilier. 219-228 [doi]
- Recommender systems and their effects on consumers: the fragmentation debateDaniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar, Andreas Buja. 229-230 [doi]
- Collective wisdom: information growth in wikis and blogsSanmay Das, Malik Magdon-Ismail. 231-240 [doi]
- Cooperation in anonymous dynamic social networksNicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Brian Rogers. 241-242 [doi]
- A behavioral study of bargaining in social networksTanmoy Chakraborty, J. Stephen Judd, Michael Kearns, Jinsong Tan. 243-252 [doi]
- Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson s voting ruleIoannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia. 253-262 [doi]
- The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choiceTyler Lu, Craig Boutilier. 263-274 [doi]
- A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulationLirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia. 275-284 [doi]
- Efficiency with linear prices: a theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auctionMartin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Georg Ziegler. 285-286 [doi]
- Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competitionPatrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman, Guha Balakrishnan. 287-296 [doi]
- Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisementsDavid H. Reiley, Sai-Ming Li, Randall A. Lewis. 297-304 [doi]
- Mix and matchItai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia. 305-314 [doi]
- Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility gamesPinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Zeyuan Allen Zhu. 315-324 [doi]
- Truthful assignment without moneyShaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh. 325-334 [doi]
- Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategiesLeslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre. 335-344 [doi]
- Cooperation and competition in strategic games with private informationAdam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai. 345-346 [doi]
- Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentionsYvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind. 347-356 [doi]
- Prediction without marketsSharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, Duncan J. Watts, David M. Pennock. 357-366 [doi]
- Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction marketAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm. 367-376 [doi]
- A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market makerAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves. 377-386 [doi]