Abstract is missing.
- Network formation in the presence of contagious riskLarry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos. 1-10 [doi]
- Optimal auctions with positive network externalitiesNima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Kamesh Munagala. 11-20 [doi]
- Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problemsDaniel P. Enemark, Mathew D. McCubbins, Ramamohan Paturi, Nicholas Weller. 21-26 [doi]
- Yield optimization of display advertising with ad exchangeSantiago Balseiro, Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan. 27-28 [doi]
- Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problemsNikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens. 29-38 [doi]
- Hiring a secretary from a posetRavi Kumar, Silvio Lattanzi, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Andrea Vattani. 39-48 [doi]
- The effects of exposure time on memory of display advertisementsDaniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri. 49-58 [doi]
- Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experimentMichael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz. 59-60 [doi]
- Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and modelsFurcy Pin, Peter Key. 61-70 [doi]
- GSP auctions with correlated typesBrendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme. 71-80 [doi]
- On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctionsIoannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou. 81-90 [doi]
- Multi-keyword sponsored searchPeerapong Dhangwatnotai. 91-100 [doi]
- A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economicsFederico Echenique, Daniel Golovin, Adam Wierman. 101-110 [doi]
- Repeated matching pennies with limited randomnessMichele Budinich, Lance Fortnow. 111-118 [doi]
- Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact gamesAlbert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 119-126 [doi]
- Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher marketsBenjamin E. Birnbaum, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lin Xiao. 127-136 [doi]
- Economies with non-convex production and complexity equilibriaChristos H. Papadimitriou, Christopher A. Wilkens. 137-146 [doi]
- Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long wayPranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan, Ian Post. 147-156 [doi]
- The role of social networks in online shopping: information passing, price of trust, and consumer choiceStephen Guo, Mengqiu Wang, Jure Leskovec. 157-166 [doi]
- Who moderates the moderators?: crowdsourcing abuse detection in user-generated contentArpita Ghosh, Satyen Kale, R. Preston McAfee. 167-176 [doi]
- Axiomatic attribution for multilinear functionsYi Sun, Mukund Sundararajan. 177-178 [doi]
- Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxesLirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang. 179-188 [doi]
- A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated contentArpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel. 189-198 [doi]
- Mechanisms for multi-level marketingYuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar. 209-218 [doi]
- Concordance among holdouts: extended abstractScott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl. 219-220 [doi]
- Only valuable experts can be valuedMoshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Nicolas S. Lambert, Omer Reingold. 221-222 [doi]
- Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgetsAmos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia, Piotr Sankowski. 223-232 [doi]
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond robertsShahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan. 233-242 [doi]
- Envy, truth, and profitJason Hartline, Qiqi Yan. 243-252 [doi]
- Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agentsShuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Azarakhsh Malekian. 253-262 [doi]
- Mechanisms for complement-free procurementShahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer. 273-282 [doi]
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networksRuben Juarez, Rajnish Kumar. 283-284 [doi]
- Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling gamesPhilipp von Falkenhausen, Tobias Harks. 285-294 [doi]
- Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goodsAvinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan. 295-296 [doi]
- An optimization-based framework for automated market-makingJacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 297-306 [doi]
- Market making and mean reversionTanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns. 307-314 [doi]
- Pseudorandom financial derivativesDavid Zuckerman. 315-320 [doi]
- Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchangeItai Ashlagi, Alvin Roth. 321-322 [doi]
- A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentivesPanagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes. 323-332 [doi]
- The college admissions problem with a continuum of studentsEduardo M. Azevedo, Jacob D. Leshno. 333-334 [doi]
- Matching with couples revisitedItai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim. 335-336 [doi]
- Multilateral matchingJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers. 337-338 [doi]
- Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learningKrishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan. 339-340 [doi]
- Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism designPaul Dütting, Felix Fischer, David C. Parkes. 341-350 [doi]
- Best-response auctionsNoam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar. 351-360 [doi]
- Money for nothing: exploiting negative externalitiesChangrong Deng, Sasa Pekec. 361-370 [doi]
- Menu pricing competition and a common agency with informed principalsHamid Nazerzadeh, Georgia Perakis. 371-372 [doi]