Abstract is missing.
- Cascading behavior in social and economic networksJon M. Kleinberg. 1-4 [doi]
- Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from hereAlvin E. Roth. 5-6 [doi]
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed informationIttai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff, Michael Grubb. 7-8 [doi]
- Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networksNoga Alon, Yishay Mansour, Moshe Tennenholtz. 9-24 [doi]
- Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous poolsItai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi. 25-26 [doi]
- Unbalanced random matching marketsItai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno. 27-28 [doi]
- Super-efficient rational proofsPablo Daniel Azar, Silvio Micali. 29-30 [doi]
- Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementaritiesEduardo M. Azevedo, John William Hatfield. 31-32 [doi]
- Bertrand networksMoshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan. 33-34 [doi]
- Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computationMoshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 35-52 [doi]
- Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and designSantiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 53-54 [doi]
- The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix gamesSiddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman. 55-72 [doi]
- Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight methodAnand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala. 73-90 [doi]
- Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered biddersSayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Xiaoming Xu. 91-102 [doi]
- A markov chain approximation to choice modelingJose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego, Vineet Goyal. 103-104 [doi]
- Optimizing password composition policiesJeremiah Blocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet. 105-122 [doi]
- Harnessing the power of two crossmatchesAvrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ankit Sharma. 123-140 [doi]
- Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker"Aditya Bhave, Eric Budish. 141-142 [doi]
- When do noisy votes reveal the truth?Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah. 143-160 [doi]
- Robust incentives for information acquisitionGabriel D. Carroll. 161-162 [doi]
- Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approachDenis Xavier Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lei Wang 0010. 163-180 [doi]
- Auctions with unique equilibriaShuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline. 181-196 [doi]
- Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networksWei Chen 0013, Yajun Wang, Dongxiao Yu, Li Zhang 0001. 197-214 [doi]
- Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacyYiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan. 215-232 [doi]
- On discrete preferences and coordinationFlavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren. 233-250 [doi]
- Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without paymentsRichard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel. 251-268 [doi]
- Mechanism design via optimal transportConstantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos. 269-286 [doi]
- Prior-free auctions for budgeted agentsNikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline. 287-304 [doi]
- Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online biddersNikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang 0002, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan. 305-322 [doi]
- Failure-aware kidney exchangeJohn P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm. 323-340 [doi]
- A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. electionsMiroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, David Rothschild. 341-358 [doi]
- Incentives, gamification, and game theory: an economic approach to badge designDavid Easley, Arpita Ghosh. 359-376 [doi]
- A network approach to public goodsMatthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub. 377-378 [doi]
- Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterizationRoee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira, David Wajc. 379-396 [doi]
- Learning equilibria of games via payoff queriesJohn Fearnley, Martin Gairing, Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani. 397-414 [doi]
- Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supplyUriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz. 415-416 [doi]
- Pricing public goods for private saleMichal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme. 417-434 [doi]
- Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functionsDimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos. 435-452 [doi]
- Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism designHu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 453-470 [doi]
- Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agentsHu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy. 471-488 [doi]
- What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction marketsXi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang, Yiling Chen. 489-506 [doi]
- Complex contagion and the weakness of long ties in social networks: revisitedGolnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Jie Gao. 507-524 [doi]
- Incentivizing participation in online forums for educationArpita Ghosh, Jon M. Kleinberg. 525-542 [doi]
- Privacy and coordination: computing on databases with endogenous participationArpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett. 543-560 [doi]
- Real-time optimization of personalized assortmentsNegin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Paat Rusmevichientong. 561-562 [doi]
- Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing gamesRagavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason R. Marden, Adam Wierman. 563-564 [doi]
- The menu-size complexity of auctionsSergiu Hart, Noam Nisan. 565-566 [doi]
- Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfersMartin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Berthold Vöcking. 567-582 [doi]
- A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctionsDarrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens. 583-584 [doi]
- Selection and influence in cultural dynamicsDavid Kempe, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 585-586 [doi]
- Measuring the performance of large-scale combinatorial auctions: a structural estimation approachSang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 587-588 [doi]
- On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism designRobert Kleinberg, Yang Yuan. 589-602 [doi]
- Designing for diversity in matching: extended abstractScott Duke Kominers, Tayfun Sönmez. 603-604 [doi]
- Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour, Motty Perry. 605-606 [doi]
- Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing gamesEuiwoong Lee, Katrina Ligett. 607-620 [doi]
- Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmaciesNektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore, Nicolas Christin. 621-638 [doi]
- Down-to-the-minute effects of super bowl advertising on online search behaviorRandall A. Lewis, David H. Reiley. 639-656 [doi]
- An axiomatic characterization of adaptive-liquidity market makersXiaolong Li, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 657-674 [doi]
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent valuesYunan Li. 675-676 [doi]
- Social learning and aggregate network uncertaintyIlan Lobel, Evan Sadler. 677-678 [doi]
- Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctionsBrandon A. Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald, Michael P. Wellman. 679-696 [doi]
- Loss calibrated methods for bipartite rationing: bipartite rationingHervé Moulin, Jay Sethuraman. 697-714 [doi]
- Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertaintyGeorgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma. 715-732 [doi]
- Two-sided matching with partial informationBaharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 733-750 [doi]
- Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctionsBen Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key. 751-766 [doi]
- Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent valuesTim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 767-784 [doi]
- Cost function market makers for measurable spacesYiling Chen, Mike Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 785-802 [doi]
- House allocation with indifferences: a generalization and a unified viewDaniela Sabán, Jay Sethuraman. 803-820 [doi]
- Selection effects in online sharing: consequences for peer adoptionSean J. Taylor, Eytan Bakshy, Sinan Aral. 821-836 [doi]
- Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auctionDavid Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 837-852 [doi]
- Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problemRodrigo A. Velez. 853-854 [doi]
- Latency arbitrage, market fragmentation, and efficiency: a two-market modelElaine Wah, Michael P. Wellman. 855-872 [doi]
- Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objectiveMichal Feldman, Yoav Wilf. 873-890 [doi]
- Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods gamesMichael Wunder, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts. 891-908 [doi]