Abstract is missing.
- Centrality, gossip, and diffusion of information in networksMatthew O. Jackson. 1 [doi]
- Strategic trading in informationally complex environmentsNicolas S. Lambert, Michael Ostrovsky, Mikhail Panov. 3-4 [doi]
- Incentivizing explorationPeter Frazier, David Kempe, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg. 5-22 [doi]
- Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with samplingHu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg. 23-36 [doi]
- An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanismsTimo Mennle, Sven Seuken. 37-38 [doi]
- Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad matchWei Chen, Di He, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin, Yixin Tao, Liwei Wang. 39-56 [doi]
- Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctionsPaul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes. 57-74 [doi]
- Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctionsYoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, David Kurokawa. 75-92 [doi]
- Optimizing prices in descending clock auctionsTri-Dung Nguyen, Tuomas Sandholm. 93-110 [doi]
- A dynamic network game for the adoption of new technologiesMatt V. Leduc. 111 [doi]
- Characterizing strategic cascades on networksTravis Martin, Grant Schoenebeck, Michael P. Wellman. 113-130 [doi]
- The polarizing effect of network influencesMohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, David L. Malec. 131-148 [doi]
- Re-incentivizing discovery: mechanisms for partial-progress sharing in researchSiddhartha Banerjee, Ashish Goel, Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy. 149-166 [doi]
- Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraintsGagan Goel, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme. 167-184 [doi]
- Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocationPaul Milgrom, Ilya Segal. 185-186 [doi]
- The performance of deferred-acceptance auctionsPaul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden. 187-204 [doi]
- Individual security and network designDiego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal. 205-206 [doi]
- Cryptographically blinded games: leveraging players' limitations for equilibria and profitPavel Hubácek, Sunoo Park. 207-208 [doi]
- The complexity of fairness through equilibriumAbraham Othman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein. 209-226 [doi]
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menusZihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang. 227-240 [doi]
- Modularity and greed in double auctionsPaul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 241-258 [doi]
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributionsYiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias. 259-276 [doi]
- Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settingsShuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna Karlin. 277-294 [doi]
- Efficient voting via the top-k elicitation scheme: a probabilistic approachYuval Filmus, Joel Oren. 295-312 [doi]
- A local-dominance theory of voting equilibriaReshef Meir, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. 313-330 [doi]
- Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functionsHaris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt. 331-332 [doi]
- Neutrality and geometry of mean votingSébastien Lahaie, Nisarg Shah. 333-350 [doi]
- Optimal allocation without money: an engineering approachItai Ashlagi, Peng Shi. 351-352 [doi]
- Two-sided matching with one-sided preferencesGuillaume Haeringer, Vincent Iehlé. 353 [doi]
- Dynamic matching market designMohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, Shayan Oveis Gharan. 355 [doi]
- Misdirected search effort in a matching market: causes, consequences and a partial solutionJohn Joseph Horton. 357 [doi]
- Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problemsChien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 359-376 [doi]
- Removing arbitrage from wagering mechanismsYiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 377-394 [doi]
- Information aggregation in exponential family marketsJacob Abernethy, Sindhu Kutty, Sébastien Lahaie, Rahul Sami. 395-412 [doi]
- A general volume-parameterized market making frameworkJacob D. Abernethy, Rafael M. Frongillo, Xiaolong Li, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 413-430 [doi]
- Reasoning about optimal stable matchings under partial informationBaharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Robert Irving, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 431-448 [doi]
- Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklistsYannai A. Gonczarowski. 449 [doi]
- Managing congestion in decentralized matching marketsNick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari, Yash Kanoria. 451 [doi]
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problemPiotr Krysta, David Manlove, Baharak Rastegari, Jinshan Zhang. 453-470 [doi]
- The wisdom of smaller, smarter crowdsDaniel G. Goldstein, Randolph Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri. 471-488 [doi]
- Revealing and incorporating implicit communities to improve recommender systemsEuijin Choo, Ting Yu, Min Chi, Yan Sun. 489-506 [doi]
- Trick or treat: putting peer prediction to the testXi Alice Gao, Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen, Ryan Prescott Adams. 507-524 [doi]
- Corporate prediction markets: evidence from google, ford, and firm XBo Cowgill, Eric Zitzewitz. 525 [doi]
- Incentivized optimal advert assignment via utility decompositionFrank P. Kelly, Peter Key, Neil S. Walton. 527 [doi]
- Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machinesEric J. Friedman, Ali Ghodsi, Christos-Alexandros Psomas. 529-546 [doi]
- Time-inconsistent planning: a computational problem in behavioral economicsJon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren. 547-564 [doi]
- Towards a better measure of business proximity: topic modeling for analyzing M AsZhan Shi, Gene Moo Lee, Andrew B. Whinston. 565 [doi]
- Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: the role of test-control interferenceThomas Blake, Dominic Coey. 567-582 [doi]
- Whole page optimization: how page elements interact with the position auctionPavel Metrikov, Fernando Diaz, Sébastien Lahaie, Justin Rao. 583-600 [doi]
- Local computation mechanism designAvinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai Vardi. 601-616 [doi]
- Reallocation mechanismsLiad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski. 617 [doi]
- Knightian self uncertainty in the vcg mechanism for unrestricted combinatorial auctionsAlessandro Chiesa, Silvio Micali, Zeyuan Allen Zhu. 619-620 [doi]
- Extensive-form game abstraction with boundsChristian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm. 621-638 [doi]
- Bounds for the query complexity of approximate equilibriaPaul W. Goldberg, Aaron Roth. 639-656 [doi]
- Finding approximate nash equilibria of bimatrix games via payoff queriesJohn Fearnley, Rahul Savani. 657-674 [doi]
- Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin sharesAriel D. Procaccia, Junxing Wang. 675-692 [doi]
- Price of anarchy for auction revenueJason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart. 693-710 [doi]
- Mechanism design for data scienceShuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov. 711-712 [doi]
- Routing and staffing when servers are strategicRagavendran Gopalakrishnan, Sherwin Doroudi, Amy R. Ward, Adam Wierman. 713-714 [doi]
- Multiplicative bidding in online advertisingMohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Sam Chiu-wai Wong. 715-732 [doi]
- Cournot competition in networked marketsKostas Bimpikis, Shayan Ehsani, Rahmi Ilkiliç. 733 [doi]
- Network formation games with heterogeneous players and the internet structureEli A. Meirom, Shie Mannor, Ariel Orda. 735-752 [doi]
- Simple approximate equilibria in large gamesYakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz. 753-770 [doi]
- Asymptotically truthful equilibrium selection in large congestion gamesRyan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth. 771-782 [doi]
- On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanismMoshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme. 783-800 [doi]
- Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalenceJohn William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, Scott Duke Kominers. 801 [doi]
- Optimal impartial selectionFelix Fischer, Max Klimm. 803-820 [doi]
- Long-run learning in games of cooperationWinter A. Mason, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts. 821-838 [doi]
- Strategic information platforms: selective disclosure and the price of "free"Chen Hajaj, David Sarne. 839-856 [doi]
- Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in gamesJames R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 857-874 [doi]
- Pragmatic algorithmic game theoryKevin Leyton-Brown. 875-876 [doi]
- Mechanism with unique learnable equilibriaPaul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Éva Tardos. 877-894 [doi]
- Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexityYang Cai, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 895-910 [doi]
- Contract complexityMoshe Babaioff, Eyal Winter. 911 [doi]
- Optimal contest design for simple agentsArpita Ghosh, Robert Kleinberg. 913-930 [doi]
- Buying private data without verificationArpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett, Aaron Roth, Grant Schoenebeck. 931-948 [doi]
- Differentially private and incentive compatible recommendation system for the adoption of network goodsKevin He, Xiaosheng Mu. 949-966 [doi]
- A dynamic model of certification and reputationMihaela van der Schaar, Simpson Z. Zhang. 967-968 [doi]
- The empirical implications of privacy-aware choiceRachel Cummings, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman. 969 [doi]
- Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problemDrew Fudenberg, Alexander Peysakhovich. 971-986 [doi]
- Dynamically eliciting unobservable informationChristopher P. Chambers, Nicolas S. Lambert. 987-988 [doi]
- Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacksShipra Agrawal, Nikhil R. Devanur. 989-1006 [doi]