Table of Contents

• The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement LearningEtan A. Green, E. Barry Plunkett. 1-27 [doi]
• Computationally Tractable ChoiceModibo K. Camara. 28 [doi]
• The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement OptimizationJon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan. 29 [doi]
• Artificial Intelligence and Auction DesignMartino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz. 30-31 [doi]
• Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-CommerceLeon Musolff. 32-33 [doi]
• Monotone Additive StatisticsXiaosheng Mu, Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz. 34 [doi]
• Closure Operators: Complexity and Applications to Classification and Decision-makingHamed Hamze Bajgiran, Federico Echenique. 35-55 [doi]
• Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model UncertaintyXiaoyu Cheng. 56-57 [doi]
• Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus AccuracyAnnie Liang, Jay Lu, Xiaosheng Mu. 58-59 [doi]
• Randomized FIFO MechanismsFrancisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan. 60 [doi]
• On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic MatchingSüleyman Kerimov, Itai Ashlagi, Itai Gurvich. 61 [doi]
• The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching MarketsMohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, Amin Saberi. 62 [doi]
• Dynamic Spatial MatchingYash Kanoria. 63-64 [doi]
• Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time for Your Best InterestAviv Yaish, Saar Tochner, Aviv Zohar. 65-88 [doi]
• Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-StakeMatheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu. 89-114 [doi]
• Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market MakersGuillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, Stephen P. Boyd. 115-128 [doi]
• Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed ComputingNikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach. 129-149 [doi]
• Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to AuctionsNir Bachrach, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 150 [doi]
• On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism DesignJerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes. 151-152 [doi]
• Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean ConstraintsEthan Che. 153-181 [doi]
• Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading MechanismWanchang Zhang. 182-183 [doi]
• The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto GameAkash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Matthew Weinberg. 184-207 [doi]
• An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal CouplingsVianney Perchet, Philippe Rigollet, Thibaut Le Gouic. 208-209 [doi]
• Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form GamesJakub Cerný, Bo An 0001, Allan N. Zhang. 210-239 [doi]
• Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and ApplicationsEvan Friedman, Felix Mauersberger. 240-241 [doi]
• Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary ProblemNick Arnosti, Will Ma. 242 [doi]
• The Stationary Prophet Inequality ProblemKristen Kessel, Ali Shameli, Amin Saberi, David Wajc. 243-244 [doi]
• Individual Fairness in Prophet InequalitiesMakis Arsenis, Robert Kleinberg. 245 [doi]
• Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet InequalitySaeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Rad Niazadeh. 246 [doi]
• Seeding a Simple ContagionEvan Sadler. 247-248 [doi]
• On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network SegregationRediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali. 249-284 [doi]
• Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online GameDaniel Goetz, Wei Lu 0020. 285-286 [doi]
• The Production and Consumption of Social MediaApostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Elliot Lipnowski. 287-288 [doi]
• Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design?: Theory and EvidenceNatalie Cox, Ricardo Fonseca, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson. 289 [doi]
• Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School DistrictMaxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo, Juliette Love, Katherine Mentzer, Lulabel Ruiz-Setz, Henry O'Connell. 290-291 [doi]
• A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School ChoiceDong Woo Hahm, Minseon Park. 292-293 [doi]
• Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible ObjectsÖzgün Ekici. 294 [doi]
• Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising AuctionsShumpei Goke, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ralph A. Mastromonaco, Samuel S. Seljan. 295 [doi]
• Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price RulesMiguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer. 296 [doi]
• Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising EffectsGeorge Gui, Harikesh Nair, Fengshi Niu. 297 [doi]
• Chasing Stars: Firms' Strategic Responses to Online Consumer RatingsMegan Hunter. 298-299 [doi]
• Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without ConvexityPaul Milgrom, Mitchell Watt. 300 [doi]
• Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing NetworksJ. Massey Cashore, Peter I. Frazier, Éva Tardos. 301-302 [doi]
• The Competition Complexity of Dynamic PricingJohannes Brustle, José R. Correa, Paul Dütting, Victor Verdugo. 303-320 [doi]
• Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig EconomyTristan Pollner, Mohammad Roghani, Amin Saberi, David Wajc. 321-322 [doi]
• Granular DeGroot Dynamics - a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social NetworksGideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz. 323-324 [doi]
• Learning in Repeated Interactions on NetworksWanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz. 325 [doi]
• A Population's Feasible Posterior BeliefsItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko. 326-327 [doi]
• Bias-Variance GamesYiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov. 328-329 [doi]
• Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism DesignAfshin Nikzad. 330-331 [doi]
• Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased AgentsDeniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser, Alexander Winter. 332-333 [doi]
• A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited CommitmentNiccolò Lomys, Takuro Yamashita. 334 [doi]
• Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation MechanismsEstelle Marine Varloot, Rida Laraki. 335-369 [doi]
• The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential InvestmentRon Bekkerman, Maxime C. Cohen, Edward Kung, John Maiden, Davide Proserpio. 370 [doi]
• Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and TaxisMario Leccese. 371-372 [doi]
• Statistical Discrimination in Stable MatchingsRémi Castera, Patrick Loiseau, Bary S. R. Pradelski. 373-374 [doi]
• Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic CandidatesVitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Patrick Loiseau. 375-403 [doi]
• On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting MechanismsBiaoshuai Tao. 404-434 [doi]
• Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and IncentivesMoshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige. 435 [doi]
• Fair Allocations for Smoothed UtilitiesYushi Bai, Uriel Feige, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia. 436-465 [doi]
• Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence AnalysisDian Yu, Jianjun Gao 0001, Weiping Wu, Zizhuo Wang 0001. 466-467 [doi]
• Persuasion as TransportationItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy. 468 [doi]
• Credible PersuasionXiao Lin, Ce Liu. 469 [doi]
• Motivating Effort with Information about Future RewardsChang Liu. 470 [doi]
• Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement LearningJibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng 0004, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael I. Jordan, Haifeng Xu. 471-472 [doi]
• Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained BuyersEleni Batziou, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl. 473-474 [doi]
• Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target ClippingSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo. 475 [doi]
• Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency GuaranteesSantiago R. Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar. 476 [doi]
• Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized MechanismsShao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala. 477-496 [doi]
• Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility LocationPriyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan. 497-528 [doi]
• Improved Price of Anarchy via PredictionsVasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan. 529-557 [doi]
• Mechanism Design with a Common DatasetModibo K. Camara. 558 [doi]
• Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic DecisionsLaura Blattner, Scott Nelson, Jann Spiess. 559 [doi]
• Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member DistrictsNikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David Rothschild, David B. Shmoys. 560-561 [doi]
• In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always WinsPaul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia. 562 [doi]
• Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in VotingSoroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah 0001. 563-600 [doi]
• A Model of Repeated Collective DecisionsAntonin Macé, Rafael Treibich. 601 [doi]
• Estimation of Standard Auction ModelsYeshwanth Cherapanamjeri, Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Manolis Zampetakis. 602-603 [doi]
• Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable RegressionEdvard Bakhitov, Amandeep Singh. 604-605 [doi]
• Design and Analysis of Bipartite Experiments Under a Linear Exposure-response ModelChristopher Harshaw, Fredrik Sävje, David Eisenstat, Vahab Mirrokni, Jean Pouget-Abadie. 606 [doi]
• Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated ProductsLorenzo Magnolfi, Jonathon McClure, Alan Sorensen. 607 [doi]
• Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai 0002, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao. 608-663 [doi]
• Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous InformationYingkai Li. 664-665 [doi]
• Delegated Pandora's BoxCurtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel. 666-693 [doi]
• Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant PlatformZi Yang Kang, Ellen V. Muir. 694-695 [doi]
• Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring RulesManeesha Papireddygari, Bo Waggoner. 703-704 [doi]
• Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of RandomizationMatteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti 0001. 705-735 [doi]
• Public Signals in Network Congestion GamesSvenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer 0001, Max Klimm, Tim Koglin. 736 [doi]
• Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse SelectionNicole Immorlica, Andre M. Sztutman, Robert M. Townsend. 737-738 [doi]
• Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity AttacksYotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz. 739-759 [doi]
• Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression ProblemsKun Jin, Xueru Zhang, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu. 760-790 [doi]
• Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as BaitFederico Echenique, Kevin He. 791 [doi]
• Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General NetworksYukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li, Xiang Yan. 792-793 [doi]
• Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous PricesPeng Shi. 794 [doi]
• Preference Dynamics Under Personalized RecommendationsSarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern. 795-816 [doi]
• Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of ProductsArash Asadpour, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli. 817 [doi]
• Online Bayesian Recommendation with No RegretYiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu. 818-819 [doi]
• Bayesian and Randomized Clock AuctionsMichal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin 0001. 820-845 [doi]
• Speculation in Procurement AuctionsShanglyu Deng. 846 [doi]
• Double Auctions and Transaction CostsSimon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski, Marek Pycia. 847 [doi]
• Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete InformationS. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner. 848 [doi]
• The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction DesignReza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang. 849-868 [doi]
• Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton CongestionChenghan Zhou, Thanh H. Nguyen, Haifeng Xu. 869 [doi]
• Information Design in Concave GamesAlex Smolin, Takuro Yamashita. 870 [doi]
• Herd DesignItai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky. 871-872 [doi]
• A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive ValuesSoheil Ghili. 873 [doi]
• Costly Multidimensional ScreeningFrank Yang. 874 [doi]
• Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-ImplementableS. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou. 875-896 [doi]
• Recommender Systems meet Mechanism DesignYang Cai 0001, Constantinos Daskalakis. 897-914 [doi]
• Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated EquilibriaIoannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm. 915-916 [doi]
• Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic AgentsNika Haghtalab, Thodoris Lykouris, Sloan Nietert, Alexander Wei 0001. 917-918 [doi]
• Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single ControllerMuhammed O. Sayin, Kaiqing Zhang, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. 919-936 [doi]
• Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted DelaysHan Wu, Stefan Wager. 937-955 [doi]
• How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in IndiaOrhan Aygün, Bertan Turhan. 956-957 [doi]
• The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and EvidencePéter Biró, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer, Sándor Sovago. 958-959 [doi]
• A Continuum Model of Stable Matching with Finite CapacitiesNick Arnosti. 960 [doi]
• On Two-sided Matching in Infinite MarketsYunseo Choi. 961 [doi]
• Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable ResourcesSteven Delong, Alireza Farhadi, Rad Niazadeh, Balasubramanian Sivan. 962-963 [doi]
• Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable ResourcesYiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi. 964-965 [doi]
• Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable ResourcesRajan Udwani. 966 [doi]
• Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online BenchmarkMark Braverman, Mahsa Derakhshan, Antonio Molina Lovett. 967-985 [doi]
• Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel TrafficVahideh H. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Daniela Sabán, Akshaya Suresh. 986-987 [doi]
• Optimization of Scoring RulesYingkai Li, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu. 988-989 [doi]
• Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable SignalsEric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden. 990-1012 [doi]
• Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite ForecastersPavel Atanasov, Jens Witkowski, Barbara A. Mellers, Philip Tetlock. 1013-1014 [doi]
• Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market DesignBobak Pakzad-Hurson. 1015 [doi]
• Equity in Resident Crowdsourcing: Measuring Under-reporting without Ground Truth DataZhi Liu, Nikhil Garg. 1016-1017 [doi]
• Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public CloudPatrick Hummel, Michael Schwarz. 1018-1039 [doi]
• Matchmaking Strategies for Maximizing Player Engagement in Video GamesMingliu Chen, Adam N. Elmachtoub, Xiao Lei. 1040 [doi]
• A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer ReviewYichi Zhang, Fang-Yi Yu, Grant Schoenebeck, David Kempe 0001. 1041-1080 [doi]
• When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?Will Ma. 1081 [doi]
• Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple PrizesEmily Dale, Jessica Fielding, Hari Ramakrishnan, Sacheth Sathyanarayanan, S. Matthew Weinberg. 1082-1100 [doi]
• Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess TournamentsPascal Führlich, Ágnes Cseh, Pascal Lenzner. 1101-1102 [doi]
• Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive ProcessThayer Morrill, Peter Troyan. 1103 [doi]
• Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated DeletionJavier Cembrano, Felix A. Fischer, David Hannon, Max Klimm. 1104-1105 [doi]
• Competitive Equilibrium with Chores: Combinatorial Algorithm and HardnessBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Peter McGlaughlin, Ruta Mehta. 1106-1107 [doi]
• Improved Upper Bounds for Finding Tarski Fixed PointsXi Chen, Yuhao Li. 1108-1118 [doi]
• Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-GenerationBrian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm. 1119-1120 [doi]
• Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation ConstraintsHanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng 0002, Vincent Conitzer. 1121-1140 [doi]
• Optimal and Differentially Private Data Acquisition: Central and Local MechanismsAlireza Fallah 0001, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. 1141 [doi]
• Information Design for Differential PrivacyIan M. Schmutte, Nathan Yoder. 1142-1143 [doi]
• Contextually Private MechanismsAndreas Alexander Haupt, Zoë Kettler Hitzig. 1144 [doi]
• Private Private InformationKevin He, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz. 1145 [doi]
• The Multi-secretary Problem with Many TypesOmar Besbes, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar. 1146-1147 [doi]
• General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary MatchingTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang. 1148-1177 [doi]
• Robust Bounds for Welfare AnalysisZi Yang Kang, Shoshana Vasserman. 1178 [doi]
• Lotteries for Shared ExperiencesNick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet. 1179-1180 [doi]
• An Economic Framework for Vaccine PrioritizationMohammad Akbarpour, Eric Budish, Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers. 1181 [doi]
• Outcome-Driven Dynamic Refugee Assignment with Allocation BalancingKirk Bansak, Elisabeth Paulson. 1182-1183 [doi]
• Just Resource Allocation? How Algorithmic Predictions and Human Notions of Justice InteractAmanda Kube, Sanmay Das, Patrick J. Fowler, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 1184-1242 [doi]