Table of Contents

• Ad Exchanges: Research IssuesS. Muthukrishnan. 1-12 [doi]
• Adaptive Learning in Systems of Interacting AgentsH. Peyton Young. 13-16 [doi]
• Quantifying Outcomes in GamesÉva Tardos. 17 [doi]
• Competitive Routing over TimeMartin Hoefer, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Shang-Hua Teng. 18-29 [doi]
• On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for SchedulingPinyan Lu. 30-41 [doi]
• On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded ConsumersPatrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà, Carmine Ventre. 42-54 [doi]
• On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial DelaysAngelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli. 55-66 [doi]
• Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum AlgorithmLeah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Julián Mestre. 67-78 [doi]
• An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive RatioSourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur. 79-88 [doi]
• Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable ActionsPeng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo. 89-100 [doi]
• Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social NetworksDavid Arthur, Rajeev Motwani, Aneesh Sharma, Ying Xu 0002. 101-112 [doi]
• Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation SystemsOla Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz. 113-124 [doi]
• The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth GraphsJean Cardinal, Erik D. Demaine, Samuel Fiorini, Gwenaël Joret, Ilan Newman, Oren Weimann. 125-136 [doi]
• Tighter Bounds for Facility GamesPinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou. 137-148 [doi]
• Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting ProtocolsClaudia Lindner, Jörg Rothe. 149-159 [doi]
• Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local LemmaThành Nguyen, Éva Tardos. 160-171 [doi]
• Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical AssessmentRenato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis. 172-183 [doi]
• Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperationMartin Gairing. 184-195 [doi]
• Contract Auctions for Sponsored SearchSharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 196-207 [doi]
• Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display AdvertisingArpita Ghosh, Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, Randolph Sergei Vassilvitskii. 208-219 [doi]
• Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job MarketEsteban Arcaute, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 220-231 [doi]
• Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of SelfishnessLeah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Rob van Stee. 232-243 [doi]
• Competitive Repeated Allocation without PaymentsMingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves. 244-255 [doi]
• Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing GamesPaolo Penna, Florian Schoppmann, Riccardo Silvestri, Peter Widmayer. 256-267 [doi]
• Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial AgenciesYuval Emek, Michal Feldman. 268-279 [doi]
• Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games on Transitive GraphsRainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien. 280-291 [doi]
• Selfish Scheduling with Setup TimesLaurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Orestis Telelis. 292-303 [doi]
• Computational Aspects of Multimarket Price WarsNithum Thain, Adrian Vetta. 304-315 [doi]
• The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion GamesDimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis. 316-327 [doi]
• The Complexity of Models of International TradeChristopher A. Wilkens. 328-339 [doi]
• The Geometry of TruthfulnessAngelina Vidali. 340-350 [doi]
• Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent ExternalitiesMichal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf. 351-361 [doi]
• Nash Dynamics in Congestion Games with Similar ResourcesAnand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna. 362-373 [doi]
• Online Ad Assignment with Free DisposalJon Feldman, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál. 374-385 [doi]
• Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive NetworksDevansh Dikshit, Narahari Yadati. 386-397 [doi]
• An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse AuctionSaeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian. 398-409 [doi]
• Direction Preserving Zero Point Computing and ApplicationsXiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Jie Zhang. 410-421 [doi]
• Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market ModelsVijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang. 422-429 [doi]
• Route Distribution IncentivesJoud Khoury, Chaouki T. Abdallah, Kate Krause, Jorge Crichigno. 430-437 [doi]
• Wiretapping a Hidden NetworkHaris Aziz, Oded Lachish, Mike Paterson, Rahul Savani. 438-446 [doi]
• Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System AuctionsNing Chen, Edith Elkind, Nick Gravin. 447-454 [doi]
• On the Power of MediatorsJosep Díaz, Dieter Mitsche, Navin Rustagi, Jared Saia. 455-462 [doi]
• Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement PropertyTobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring. 463-470 [doi]
• A Note on Strictly Competitive GamesIlan Adler, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 471-474 [doi]
• The Efficiency of Fair DivisionIoannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou. 475-482 [doi]
• Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo MechanismKrzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis. 483-490 [doi]
• Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse TradersStanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina Epelman. 491-497 [doi]
• Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue MaximizationAmos Fiat, Amiram Wingarten. 498-504 [doi]
• Nudging Mechanisms for Technology AdoptionJacomo Corbo, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 505-512 [doi]
• Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained BiddersRavi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi. 513-520 [doi]
• Priority Right Auction for Komi SettingXiaotie Deng, Qi Qi. 521-528 [doi]
• Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback ProblemB. V. Ashwinkumar, Robert Kleinberg. 529-536 [doi]
• Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted BiddersDavid Kempe, Ahuva Mu alem, Mahyar Salek. 537-544 [doi]
• On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion GamesArash Asadpour, Amin Saberi. 545-552 [doi]
• Betting on the Real LineXi Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock. 553-560 [doi]
• Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-ProofnessTaiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo. 561-568 [doi]
• 2D-TUCKER Is PPAD-CompleteDömötör Pálvölgyi. 569-574 [doi]
• Bidder Optimal Assignments for General UtilitiesPaul Dütting, Monika Rauch Henzinger, Ingmar Weber. 575-582 [doi]
• A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian UsersXiaotie Deng, Jiajin Yu. 583-590 [doi]
• Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing GamesJoshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, Tom Wexler. 591-599 [doi]
• On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse GamesThomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Andrew Byde, Nicholas R. Jennings. 600-607 [doi]
• On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut GameLaurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot. 608-615 [doi]
• Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic AgentsMartin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik. 616-622 [doi]
• Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel MarketsQianya Lin, Yiling Chen. 623-631 [doi]
• News Posting by Strategic Users in a Social NetworkMangesh Gupte, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Lu Han, Liviu Iftode, Pravin Shankar, Raluca M. Ursu. 632-639 [doi]