Abstract is missing.
- Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Centrality in NetworksKarthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P. Michalak, Nicholas R. Jennings. 1-13 [doi]
- On Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network DesignSusanne Albers, Pascal Lenzner. 14-25 [doi]
- The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected PiecesYonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb. 26-37 [doi]
- Collusion in VCG Path Procurement AuctionsYoram Bachrach, Peter Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam. 38-49 [doi]
- Sequential Item Pricing for Unlimited SupplyMaria-Florina Balcan, Florin Constantin. 50-62 [doi]
- The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent ProblemFelipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, José R. Correa, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. 63-74 [doi]
- Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree GameDavide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Stefano Leucci, Guido Proietti. 75-86 [doi]
- A Novel Approach to Propagating DistrustChristian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Adam Tauman Kalai, Azarakhsh Malekian, Moshe Tennenholtz. 87-105 [doi]
- Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear ProgrammingNiv Buchbinder, Kamal Jain, Mohit Singh. 106-117 [doi]
- Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network EffectsOzan Candogan, Kostas Bimpikis, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. 118-132 [doi]
- Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn GamesL. Elisa Celis, Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Peres. 133-144 [doi]
- Selective Call Out and Real Time BiddingTanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan. 145-157 [doi]
- Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit AuctionsTanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan. 158-169 [doi]
- Truthful Mechanisms for ExhibitionsGeorge Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz. 170-181 [doi]
- A Truthful Constant Approximation for Maximizing the Minimum Load on Related MachinesGeorge Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Rob van Stee. 182-193 [doi]
- Braess s Paradox in Large Sparse GraphsFan Chung, Stephen J. Young. 194-208 [doi]
- False-Name-Proofness in Social NetworksVincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchford, Kamesh Munagala, Liad Wagman. 209-221 [doi]
- Stackelberg Strategies for Network Design GamesAngelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli. 222-233 [doi]
- Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location GamesDimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos. 234-245 [doi]
- Constrained Non-monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary AlgorithmsAnupam Gupta, Aaron Roth, Grant Schoenebeck, Kunal Talwar. 246-257 [doi]
- Strategic Cooperation in Cost Sharing GamesMartin Hoefer. 258-269 [doi]
- Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot OligopoliesNicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Piliouras. 270-281 [doi]
- An FPTAS for Bargaining Networks with Unequal Bargaining PowersYashodhan Kanoria. 282-293 [doi]
- Value of Learning in Sponsored Search AuctionsSai-Ming Li, Mohammad Mahdian, Randolph Preston McAfee. 294-305 [doi]
- Exploiting Myopic LearningMohamed Mostagir. 306-318 [doi]
- The Limits of Smoothness: A Primal-Dual Framework for Price of Anarchy BoundsUri Nadav, Tim Roughgarden. 319-326 [doi]
- On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling AuctionsElias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos. 327-338 [doi]
- Near-Strong Equilibria in Network Creation GamesOla Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz. 339-353 [doi]
- You Share, I Share: Network Effects and Economic Incentives in P2P File-Sharing SystemsMahyar Salek, Shahin Shayandeh, David Kempe. 354-365 [doi]
- The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing GamesVasilis Syrgkanis. 366-377 [doi]
- Practical and Efficient Approximations of Nash Equilibria for Win-Lose Games Based on Graph SpectraHaralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis. 378-390 [doi]
- Market Communication in Production EconomiesChristopher A. Wilkens. 391-401 [doi]
- Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted PreferencesLirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer. 402-414 [doi]
- Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract)Hessameddin Akhlaghpour, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nima Haghpanah, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Hamid Mahini, Afshin Nikzad. 415-423 [doi]
- Equilibrium Pricing with Positive Externalities (Extended Abstract)Nima Anari, Shayan Ehsani, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Hamid Mahini, Vahab S. Mirrokni. 424-431 [doi]
- The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative GamesYoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings. 432-443 [doi]
- Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path PricingPatrick Briest, Parinya Chalermsook, Sanjeev Khanna, Bundit Laekhanukit, Danupon Nanongkai. 444-454 [doi]
- The Complexity of Determining the Uniqueness of Tarski s Fixed Point under the Lexicographic OrderingChuangyin Dang, Yinyu Ye. 455-461 [doi]
- Approximation Algorithms for Non-single-minded Profit-Maximization Problems with Limited SupplyKhaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz, Chaitanya Swamy. 462-472 [doi]
- Approximation Algorithms for Campaign ManagementEdith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski. 473-482 [doi]
- Envy-Free Pricing with General Supply ConstraintsSungjin Im, Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang. 483-491 [doi]
- Impersonation Strategies in AuctionsIan A. Kash, David C. Parkes. 492-495 [doi]
- Market Equilibrium with Transaction CostsSourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Chinmay Karande. 496-504 [doi]
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market MakersXi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen. 505-514 [doi]
- Online Labor MarketsJohn Joseph Horton. 515-522 [doi]
- Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware BiddersEvangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis. 523-530 [doi]
- On (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location GamesNguyen Kim Thang. 531-538 [doi]
- Threshold Models for Competitive Influence in Social NetworksAllan Borodin, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren. 539-550 [doi]
- Course Allocation by Proxy AuctionScott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan Ullman. 551-558 [doi]
- False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real LineTaiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo. 559-562 [doi]
- Average-Case Analysis of Mechanism Design with Approximate Resource Allocation AlgorithmsYevgeniy Vorobeychik, Yagil Engel. 571-578 [doi]