Abstract is missing.
- A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social NetworksVasileios Tzoumas, Christos Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis. 1-14 [doi]
- Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex GamesYoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, Nisarg Shah. 15-29 [doi]
- An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported ServicesJoan Feigenbaum, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas. 30-43 [doi]
- Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget LimitsPaul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger. 44-57 [doi]
- Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate TruthfulnessSamantha Leung, Edward Lui. 58-71 [doi]
- Bounded-Distance Network Creation GamesDavide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti. 72-85 [doi]
- Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover EffectsNikolay Archak, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan. 86-99 [doi]
- Choosing Products in Social NetworksSunil Simon, Krzysztof R. Apt. 100-113 [doi]
- Efficiently Learning from Revealed PreferenceMorteza Zadimoghaddam, Aaron Roth. 114-127 [doi]
- Funding Games: The Truth but Not the Whole TruthAmotz Bar-Noy, Yi Gai, Matthew P. Johnson, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, George Rabanca. 128-141 [doi]
- Greedy Selfish Network CreationPascal Lenzner. 142-155 [doi]
- Group Activity Selection ProblemAndreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer, Gerhard J. Woeginger. 156-169 [doi]
- Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake CuttingAvishay Maya, Noam Nisan. 170-183 [doi]
- LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of AnarchyGeorgios Piliouras, Tomás Valla, László A. Végh. 184-197 [doi]
- Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse SellerAnand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty 0001, Sanjeev Khanna. 198-211 [doi]
- Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via CrowdsourcingSwaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, James Y. Zou. 212-226 [doi]
- Non-redistributive Second Welfare TheoremsBundit Laekhanukit, Guyslain Naves, Adrian Vetta. 227-243 [doi]
- On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing MechanismsNicole Immorlica, Emmanouil Pountourakis. 244-255 [doi]
- On Coalitions and Stable Winners in PluralityDvir Falik, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz. 256-269 [doi]
- On the Efficiency of Influence-and-Exploit Strategies for Revenue Maximization under Positive ExternalitiesDimitris Fotakis, Paris Siminelakis. 270-283 [doi]
- On the Efficiency of the Simplest Pricing Mechanisms in Two-Sided MarketsVolodymyr Kuleshov, Gordon T. Wilfong. 284-297 [doi]
- Optimal Pricing Is HardConstantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos. 298-308 [doi]
- Privacy Auctions for Recommender SystemsPranav Dandekar, Nadia Fawaz, Stratis Ioannidis. 309-322 [doi]
- Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project ProblemsVictor Naroditskiy, Mingyu Guo, Lachlan Dufton, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings. 323-336 [doi]
- Simultaneous Single-Item AuctionsKshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden. 337-349 [doi]
- Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling GamesJohanne Cohen, Christoph Dürr, Nguyen Kim Thang. 350-363 [doi]
- Social Context in Potential GamesMartin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik. 364-377 [doi]
- Take It or Leave It: Running a Survey When Privacy Comes at a CostKatrina Ligett, Aaron Roth. 378-391 [doi]
- The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General Host GraphsDavide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Stefano Leucci, Guido Proietti. 392-405 [doi]
- The Power of Local Information in Social NetworksChristian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer T. Chayes, Sanjeev Khanna, Brendan Lucier. 406-419 [doi]
- The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing Is TwoXujin Chen, Benjamin Doerr, Xiaodong Hu, Weidong Ma, Rob van Stee, Carola Winzen. 420-433 [doi]
- Triadic Consensus - A Randomized Algorithm for Voting in a CrowdAshish Goel, David Lee. 434-447 [doi]
- Truthful Mechanism Design for Multidimensional Covering ProblemsHadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy. 448-461 [doi]
- What I Tell You Three Times Is True: Bootstrap Percolation in Small WorldsHamed Amini, Nikolaos Fountoulakis. 462-474 [doi]
- Ad Allocation for Browse SessionsAnand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi. 475-481 [doi]
- Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social NetworkSayan Bhattacharya, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer. 482-488 [doi]
- Convergence Analysis for Weighted Joint Strategy Fictitious Play in Generalized Second Price AuctionLei Yao, Wei Chen, Tie-Yan Liu. 489-495 [doi]
- Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion EffectsMichal Feldman, Tami Tamir. 496-503 [doi]
- Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired TopologiesSwapnil Dhamal, Yadati Narahari. 504-511 [doi]
- Homophily in Online Social NetworksBassel Tarbush, Alexander Teytelboym. 512-518 [doi]
- Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue MaximizationPiotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis. 519-525 [doi]
- Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal AuctionsBalasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz. 526-531 [doi]
- On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network ExternalitiesVahab S. Mirrokni, Sebastien Roch, Mukund Sundararajan. 532-538 [doi]
- The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Connections to the 1-Median ProblemDaniela Sabán, Nicolás Stier Moses. 539-545 [doi]
- The Ring Design Game with Fair Cost Allocation - [Extended Abstract]Angelo Fanelli, Dariusz Leniowski, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski. 546-552 [doi]
- Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan ApproximationAmos Fiat, Ariel Levavi. 553-558 [doi]
- Biased Assimilation, Homophily, and the Dynamics of Polarization - (Working Paper)Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, David Lee. 559 [doi]
- Generalized Weighted Model Counting: An Efficient Monte-Carlo meta-algorithm (Working Paper)Lirong Xia. 560 [doi]
- The AND-OR Game: Equilibrium Characterization - (Working Paper)Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan. 561 [doi]