Abstract is missing.
- Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and BeyondAris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Jie Zhang 0008. 1-12 [doi]
- Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided MatchingMarek Adamczyk, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang. 13-24 [doi]
- Stable Marriage with General Preferences - Extended AbstractLinda Farczadi, Konstantinos Georgiou, Jochen Könemann. 25-36 [doi]
- The Convergence Time for Selfish Bin PackingGyörgy Dósa, Leah Epstein. 37-48 [doi]
- Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Lead to Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction GamesIoannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin. 49-60 [doi]
- Paths to Stable AllocationsAgnes Cseh, Martin Skutella. 61-73 [doi]
- Self-stabilizing Uncoupled DynamicsAaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, Rebecca N. Wright. 74-85 [doi]
- Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player UtilitiesElliot Anshelevich, John Postl. 86-97 [doi]
- Shared Resource Management via Reward SchemesShahar Dobzinski, Amir Ronen. 98-109 [doi]
- Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic DecisionsMaximilian Drees, Sören Riechers, Alexander Skopalik. 110-121 [doi]
- Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold ModelsDimitris Fotakis, Thodoris Lykouris, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova. 122-133 [doi]
- Network Cost-Sharing without AnonymityTim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers. 134-145 [doi]
- Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative ApproachEdith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski. 146-157 [doi]
- Clearing Markets via BundlesMichal Feldman, Brendan Lucier. 158-169 [doi]
- Walrasian Equilibrium with Few BuyersReshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz. 170-181 [doi]
- Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market AccessTobias Harks, Max Klimm. 182-193 [doi]
- Value of TargetingKshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 194-205 [doi]
- Welfare Guarantees for Proportional AllocationsIoannis Caragiannis, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 206-217 [doi]
- Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional DynamicsYoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic. 218-230 [doi]
- The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic FormKousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen. 231-243 [doi]
- Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix GamesArtur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski. 244-254 [doi]
- Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Base without MoneyEmmanouil Pountourakis, Guido Schäfer. 255-266 [doi]
- Prediction and Welfare in Ad AuctionsMukund Sundararajan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 267-278 [doi]
- On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism DesignRafael Pass, Karn Seth. 279-290 [doi]