Table of Contents

• Algorithmic Fairness and the Social Welfare FunctionSendhil Mullainathan. 1 [doi]
• Surge Pricing Moves Uber's Driver-PartnersAlice Lu, Peter I. Frazier, Oren Kislev. 3 [doi]
• The Sharing Economy and Housing Affordability: Evidence from AirbnbKyle Barron, Edward Kung, Davide Proserpio. 5 [doi]
• Advertising Strategy in the Presence of Reviews: An Empirical AnalysisBrett Hollenbeck, Sridhar Moorthy, Davide Proserpio. 7 [doi]
• Strategyproof Linear Regression in High DimensionsYiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001. 9-26 [doi]
• Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical EstimationYiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani. 27-44 [doi]
• Optimal and Myopic Information AcquisitionAnnie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 45-46 [doi]
• Consistent Approval-Based Multi-Winner RulesMartin Lackner, Piotr Skowron. 47-48 [doi]
• Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear UtilitiesHongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes. 49 [doi]
• Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of New Virtual MachinesIan A. Kash, Peter B. Key, Spyros I. Zoumpoulis. 51-52 [doi]
• Learnability and Models of Decision Making under UncertaintyPathikrit Basu, Federico Echenique. 53 [doi]
• Strategic Classification from Revealed PreferencesJinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 55-70 [doi]
• Overabundant Information and Learning TrapsAnnie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu. 71-72 [doi]
• Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment EffectMoshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren. 73-90 [doi]
• The Combinatorial Clock Auction: the Effects of Strategic Behaviour and the Price Increment Rule on Social WelfareMax Dupré la Tour, Adrian Vetta. 91-108 [doi]
• Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search ApproachBenedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken. 109 [doi]
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising AuctionsJason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh. 111-112 [doi]
• Computational Complexity of Proper EquilibriumKristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund. 113-130 [doi]
• Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching GameYasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, Yu Yokoi. 131-148 [doi]
• The Big Match with a Clock and a Bit of MemoryKristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, Abraham Neyman. 149-150 [doi]
• Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form GamesJakub Cerný, Branislav Boyanský, Christopher Kiekintveld. 151-168 [doi]
• Non-clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism DesignVahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo. 169 [doi]
• Robust Repeated Auctions under Heterogeneous Buyer BehaviorShipra Agrawal 0001, Constantinos Daskalakis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan. 171 [doi]
• A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit MaximizationMaria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik. 173-174 [doi]
• Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Yishay Mansour, Shay Moran. 175 [doi]
• Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual InformationYuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck. 177-194 [doi]
• Eliciting Expertise without VerificationYuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck. 195-212 [doi]
• The One-Shot Crowdfunding GameItai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky. 213-214 [doi]
• Dancing Pigs or Externalities?: Measuring the Rationality of Security DecisionsElissa M. Redmiles, Michelle L. Mazurek, John P. Dickerson. 215-232 [doi]
• Keynote Talk: High-Frequency Trading and the Design of Financial Exchanges: Will the Market Fix the Market?Eric Budish. 233-234 [doi]
• Almost Optimal Stochastic Weighted Matching with Few QueriesSoheil Behnezhad, Nima Reyhani. 235-249 [doi]
• First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice MechanismsUmut Dur, Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken. 251-268 [doi]
• Stable Marriage with Multi-Modal PreferencesJiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron. 269-286 [doi]
• Delegated Search Approximates Efficient SearchJon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg. 287-302 [doi]
• Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e BarrierYossi Azar, Ashish Chiplunkar, Haim Kaplan. 303-318 [doi]
• Prophets and Secretaries with OverbookingTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama. 319-320 [doi]
• Multiplicative Weights Update in Zero-Sum GamesJames P. Bailey, Georgios Piliouras. 321-338 [doi]
• Cycles in Zero-Sum Differential Games and Biological DiversityTung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Will Ratcliff, Vijay V. Vazirani, Peter Yunker. 339-350 [doi]
• Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher MarketsYun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole 0001, Yixin Tao. 351-368 [doi]
• Interdependent Values without Single-CrossingAlon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner. 369 [doi]
• Credible MechanismsMohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li. 371 [doi]
• The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-TradeMoshe Babaioff, Yang Cai 0001, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao. 373 [doi]
• Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link OperatorsJosé Correa, Cristóbal Guzmán, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova, Marc Schröder. 375-392 [doi]
• Polynomial Time Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion GamesCostas Busch, Rajgopal Kannan. 393-409 [doi]
• Spatio-Temporal Games Beyond One DimensionSoheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Saeed Seddighin. 411-428 [doi]
• Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive BuyerMoshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan, Aviad Rubinstein. 429 [doi]
• Revenue Loss in Shrinking MarketsShahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely. 431-442 [doi]
• 99% Revenue via Enhanced CompetitionMichal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein. 443-460 [doi]
• The A/B Testing ProblemEduardo M. Azevedo, Alex Deng, Jose Luis Montiel Olea, Justin Rao, E. Glen Weyl. 461-462 [doi]
• A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention ExperimentsImanol Arrieta Ibarra, Johan Ugander. 463-480 [doi]
• The Costs of Entering through Tying: Experimental EvidenceHyunjin Kim, Michael Luca. 481-482 [doi]
• Reputation InflationApostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Joseph M. Golden. 483-484 [doi]
• The Price of Prior Dependence in AuctionsPingzhong Tang, Yulong Zeng. 485-502 [doi]
• Prior-Independent Optimal AuctionsAmine Allouah, Omar Besbes. 503 [doi]
• Learning to Bid Without Knowing your ValueZhe Feng 0004, Chara Podimata, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 505-522 [doi]
• Selling to a No-Regret BuyerMark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, Matt Weinberg. 523-538 [doi]
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvements and GeneralizationsMohammad Ghodsi, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin, Hadi Yami. 539-556 [doi]
• Finding Fair and Efficient AllocationsSiddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy, Rohit Vaish. 557-574 [doi]
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public GoodsBrandon Fain, Kamesh Munagala, Nisarg Shah 0001. 575-592 [doi]
• How to Make Envy Vanish Over TimeGerdus Benade, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Christos-Alexandros Psomas. 593-610 [doi]
• Redistribution through MarketsPiotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour. 611 [doi]
• Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked MarketsJohn Birge, Ozan Candogan, Hongfan Chen, Daniela Sabán. 613-614 [doi]
• Trading Networks with FrictionsTamás Fleiner, Ravi Jagadeesan, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Alexander Teytelboym. 615 [doi]
• Chain Stability in Trading NetworksJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp. 617-618 [doi]
• Naive Bayesian Learning in Social NetworksJerry Anunrojwong, Nat Sothanaphan. 619-636 [doi]
• Bayesian Social Learning in a Dynamic EnvironmentKrishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Nir Hak. 637 [doi]
• Social Learning EquilibriaElchanan Mossel, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly, Omer Tamuz. 639 [doi]
• Diffusion, Seeding, and the Value of Network InformationMohammad Akbarpour, Suraj Malladi, Amin Saberi. 641 [doi]
• On the Construction of SubstitutesEric Balkanski, Renato Paes Leme. 643 [doi]
• Frugal Auction Design for Set Systems: Vertex Cover and KnapsackMohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Mohammad Reza Khani, Saeed Seddighin. 645-662 [doi]
• Matching Auctions for Search and Native AdsRuggiero Cavallo, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens. 663-680 [doi]
• The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained UsersIoannis Caragiannis, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 681-698 [doi]