Table of Contents

• Prophet Inequalities over TimeAndreas Abels, Elias Pitschmann, Daniel Schmand. 1-20 [doi]
• Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding WorldGagan Aggarwal, Andrés Perlroth, Junyao Zhao 0001. 21 [doi]
• Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic ClassificationSaba Ahmadi, Avrim Blum, Kunhe Yang. 22-58 [doi]
• Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity MarketsMete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr. 59 [doi]
• Comparison of Screening DevicesMohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, Frank Yang. 60 [doi]
• EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle NumberHannaneh Akrami, Noga Alon, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta. 61 [doi]
• The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising MarketsMiguel Alcobendas, Shunto Kobayashi, Ke Shi, Matthew Shum. 62 [doi]
• Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding WorldYeganeh Alimohammadi, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth. 63 [doi]
• Equitable stable matchings under modular assessmentAhmet Alkan, Kemal Yildiz. 64 [doi]
• Interviewing Matching in Random MarketsMaxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi. 65 [doi]
• Bayesian Analysis of Linear ContractsTal Alon, Paul Duetting, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 66 [doi]
• Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate EquilibriaGeorgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi 0001, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. 67-87 [doi]
• Multi-Item Order Fulfillment Revisited: LP Formulation and Prophet InequalityAyoub Amil, Ali Makhdoumi, Yehua Wei. 88 [doi]
• Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team GamesIoannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Stephen McAleer. 89 [doi]
• Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferencesNima Anari, Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan. 90-110 [doi]
• No-Regret Learning in Games is Turing CompleteGabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Georgios Piliouras. 111 [doi]
• Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference ApproachNemanja Antic, George Georgiadis. 112 [doi]
• Robust Auction Design with Support InformationJerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes. 113 [doi]
• A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with Correlated ArrivalsAli Aouad, Will Ma. 114 [doi]
• Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching PlatformsAli Aouad, Ömer Saritaç, Chiwei Yan. 115 [doi]
• Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media ExperimentGuy Aridor. 116 [doi]
• The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLensGuy Aridor, Duarte Gonçalves, Daniel Kluver, Ruoyan Kong, Joseph A. Konstan. 117 [doi]
• Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary DecisionsItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi. 118 [doi]
• The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social LearningItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenkoyako, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz. 119 [doi]
• Fast computation of exact confidence intervals for randomized experiments with binary outcomesP. M. Aronow, Haoge Chang, Patrick Lopatto. 120 [doi]
• On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and WelfareAlex P. Arsenault-Morin, Hayri Alper Arslan, Matthew Gentry. 121 [doi]
• Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching MarketsItai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Geng Zhao 0002. 122 [doi]
• Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than BundlingSepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman. 123-152 [doi]
• Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive ComplexityMoshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer. 153-182 [doi]
• On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing SettingsMoshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron. 183 [doi]
• Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price ImpactMarkus Baldauf, Christoph Frei, Joshua Mollner. 184 [doi]
• The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the LineEric Balkanski, Yuri Faenza, Noémie Périvier. 185-205 [doi]
• Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?Ian Ball, Jan Knoepfle. 206 [doi]
• Single-Leg Revenue Management with AdviceSantiago R. Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar. 207 [doi]
• Adaptive Algorithms and Collusion via CouplingMartino Banchio, Giacomo Mantegazza. 208 [doi]
• Allocating with Priorities and Quotas: Algorithms, Complexity, and DynamicsSiddhartha Banerjee, Matthew Eichhorn, David Kempe 0001. 209-240 [doi]
• Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public ResourcesSiddhartha Banerjee, Giannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos. 241 [doi]
• Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment ConstraintsSiddharth Barman, Arindam Khan 0001, Sudarshan Shyam, K. V. N. Sreenivas. 242-269 [doi]
• You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It TooGerdus Benade, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz. 270 [doi]
• Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital AdvertisingDirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Nicholas Wu. 271 [doi]
• Cost Based Nonlinear PricingDirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris. 272 [doi]
• Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial CostBen Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco. 273-292 [doi]
• Signaling Competition in Two-Sided MarketsOmar Besbes, Yuri Fonseca, Ilan Lobel, Fanyin Zheng. 293 [doi]
• Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual AveragingMartin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl, Matthias Oberlechner. 294 [doi]
• Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School ChoiceFederico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi 0001, Ignacio Rios, Alfredo Torrico. 295 [doi]
• Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer ReviewsTommaso Bondi. 296 [doi]
• The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product RatingsTommaso Bondi, Michelangelo Rossi, Ryan Stevens. 297 [doi]
• Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-outAriel Boyarsky, Hongseok Namkoong, Jean Pouget-Abadie. 298 [doi]
• Balanced Donor CoordinationFelix Brandt 0001, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong. 299 [doi]
• Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow PricesIdo Bright, Arthur Delarue, Ilan Lobel. 300 [doi]
• Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner VotingMarkus Brill, Jannik Peters 0001. 301 [doi]
• Prophet Inequality: Order selection beats random orderArchit Bubna, Ashish Chiplunkar. 302-336 [doi]
• Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)Eric Budish, Ruiquan Gao, Abraham Othman, Aviad Rubinstein, Qianfan Zhang 0003. 337-368 [doi]
• Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case StudyNoah Burrell, Grant Schoenebeck. 369-389 [doi]
• Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching MarketsJohannes Bäumler, Martin Bullinger, Stefan Kober, Donghao Zhu. 390 [doi]
• Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias MinimizationYang Cai, Eric Xue. 391-410 [doi]
• Correlated Cluster-Based Randomized Experiments: Robust Variance MinimizationOzan Candogan, Chen Chen, Rad Niazadeh. 411 [doi]
• Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual OutcomesMatteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti 0001. 412-448 [doi]
• Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial SelectionJavier Cembrano, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm. 449 [doi]
• The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order BeliefsYi-Chun Chen, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Mallesh M. Pai. 450 [doi]
• Feature Based Dynamic MatchingYilun Chen, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar, Wenxin Zhang. 451 [doi]
• Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter AuctionsZiyun Chen, Zhiyi Huang 0002, Dorsa Majdi, Zipeng Yan. 452-471 [doi]
• I'll Tell You Tomorrow: Committing to Future CommitmentsAndrew Bongjune Choi. 472 [doi]
• Fair allocation in graphsGeorge Christodoulou 0001, Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Alkmini Sgouritsa. 473-488 [doi]
• Mediated Communication with Transparent MotivesRoberto Corrao, Yifan Dai. 489 [doi]
• Trading ProphetsJosé R. Correa, Andrés Cristi, Paul Duetting, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Jan Olkowski, Kevin Schewior. 490-510 [doi]
• Targeting versus Competition in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Internet AdsBo Cowgill, Cosmina Dorobantu. 511 [doi]
• Equity Pay in Networked TeamsKrishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah. 512 [doi]
• Communication via hard and soft informationSulagna Dasgupta. 513 [doi]
• Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based ScreeningSulagna Dasgupta. 514 [doi]
• Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination?Rahul Deb, Ludovic Renou. 515 [doi]
• The Privacy Elasticity of Behavior: Conceptualization and ApplicationInbal Dekel, Rachel Cummings, Ori Heffetz, Katrina Ligett. 516 [doi]
• Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage FeesShahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák. 517-535 [doi]
• Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching MarketsBattal Dogan, Lars Ehlers. 536 [doi]
• Purchase History and Product PersonalizationLaura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta. 537 [doi]
• Blockchain Mediated PersuasionKimon Drakopoulos, Irene Lo, Justin Mulvany. 538 [doi]
• Ambiguous ContractsPaul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz. 539 [doi]
• Smoothed Analysis of Online Non-parametric AuctionsNaveen Durvasula, Nika Haghtalab, Manolis Zampetakis. 540-560 [doi]
• Prophet Secretary Against the Online OptimalPaul Dütting, Evangelia Gergatsouli, Rojin Rezvan, Yifeng Teng, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis. 561-581 [doi]
• Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential InspectionsRan Eilat, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan. 582 [doi]
• Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-DualFarbod Ekbatani, Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh. 583 [doi]
• Corporate Culture and Organizational FragilityMatthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub, Mathieu V. Leduc. 584 [doi]
• Discovering Opportunities in New York City's Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive MarketsYuri Faenza, Swati Gupta, Xuan Zhang. 585 [doi]
• Graph Ranking and the Cost of Sybil DefenseGwendolyn Farach-Colton, Martin Farach-Colton, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Hanna Komlós, John Lapinskas, Reut Levi, Moti Medina, Miguel A. Mosteiro. 586-625 [doi]
• On picking sequences for choresUriel Feige, Xin Huang. 626-655 [doi]
• Temporal Fairness in Learning and Earning: Price Protection Guarantee and Phase TransitionsQing Feng, Ruihao Zhu, Stefanus Jasin. 656 [doi]
• On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect RationalityDiodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre. 657-677 [doi]
• Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted AuctionsGiannis Fikioris, Éva Tardos. 678-698 [doi]
• Welfare-Maximizing Pooled TestingSimon Finster, Michelle González Amador, Edwin Lock, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Evi Micha, Ariel D. Procaccia. 699 [doi]
• Distortion Under Public-Spirited VotingBailey Flanigan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Sven Wang. 700 [doi]
• Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignmentDaniel Freund 0001, Thodoris Lykouris, Elisabeth Paulson, Bradley Sturt, Wentao Weng. 701 [doi]
• Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable SignalsRafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner. 702-733 [doi]
• Quantum Information ElicitationRafael M. Frongillo. 734 [doi]
• Robust Stackelberg EquilibriaJiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu. 735 [doi]
• Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery ContestsAbheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg. 736 [doi]
• Pricing Novel GoodsFrancesco Giovannoni, Toomas Hinnosaar. 737 [doi]
• Best of Both Distortion WorldsVasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah 0001. 738-758 [doi]
• Prizes and effort in contests with private informationSumit Goel. 759 [doi]
• Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher MarketsDenizalp Goktas, Jiayi Zhao, Amy Greenwald. 760-781 [doi]
• Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism DescriptionsYannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas. 782 [doi]
• Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market MakersMohak Goyal, Geoffrey Ramseyer, Ashish Goel, David Mazières. 783-812 [doi]
• Informationally Robust Cheap-TalkRonen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky. 813 [doi]
• Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic EquilibriaLukas Graf 0001, Tobias Harks. 814 [doi]
• A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice MechanismsAram Grigoryan, Markus Möller. 815 [doi]
• Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller UncertaintyWenshuo Guo, Nika Haghtalab, Kirthevasan Kandasamy, Ellen Vitercik. 816 [doi]
• Which Lp norm is the fairest? Approximations for fair facility location across all "p"Swati Gupta, Jai Moondra, Mohit Singh. 817 [doi]
• The Power of Menus in Contract DesignGuru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang, Junyao Zhao 0001. 818-848 [doi]
• Efficient Market Design with Distributional ObjectivesIsa Emin Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Bumin Yenmez. 849 [doi]
• Location Choice, Commuting, and School ChoiceMinseon Park, Dong Woo Hahm. 850 [doi]
• Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized InterventionRustamdjan Hakimov, Renke Schmacker, Camille Terrier. 851 [doi]
• In Defense of Liquid DemocracyDaniel Halpern 0002, Joseph Y. Halpern, Ali Jadbabaie, Elchanan Mossel, Ariel D. Procaccia, Manon Revel. 852 [doi]
• Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased AgentsJoseph Y. Halpern, Aditya Saraf. 853-884 [doi]
• The Wisdom of Strategic VotingQishen Han, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao, Lirong Xia. 885-905 [doi]
• A Rational Inattention Theory of Echo ChamberLin Hu, Anqi Li, Xu Tan. 906 [doi]
• Estimating Effects of Long-Term TreatmentsShan Huang, Chen Wang, Yuan Yuan, Jinglong Zhao, Jingjing Zhang. 907 [doi]
• A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job SchedulingXin Huang, Erel Segal-haLevi. 908 [doi]
• Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet InequalitiesJiashuo Jiang, Will Ma, Jiawei Zhang. 909 [doi]
• Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto InsuranceYizhou Jin. 910 [doi]
• Optimal Indirect Regulation of ExternalitiesZi Yang Kang. 911 [doi]
• Information Design of Online PlatformsT. Tony Ke, Song Lin, Michelle Y. Lu. 912 [doi]
• Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric DistortionFatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe 0001. 913-936 [doi]
• Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional WorldAndreas Kleiner. 937 [doi]
• Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphsMax Klimm, Maximilian J. Stahlberg. 938-955 [doi]
• Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching ExperimentAndrew Kloosterman, Peter Troyan. 956 [doi]
• Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable AlternativesHaruki Kono, Kota Saito, Alec Sandroni. 957 [doi]
• Dynamic Concern for MisspecificationGiacomo Lanzani. 958 [doi]
• Description Complexity of Regular DistributionsRenato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng, Pratik Worah. 959 [doi]
• Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias in Consumer DataTesary Lin, Avner Strulov-Shlain. 960 [doi]
• Predicting Choice from Information CostsElliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid. 961 [doi]
• Order-optimal Correlated Rounding for Fulfilling Multi-item E-commerce OrdersWill Ma. 962 [doi]
• Regret Minimization with Noisy ObservationsMohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Kangning Wang. 963 [doi]
• Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation ConstraintsIvan-Aleksandar Mavrov, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen. 964-990 [doi]
• Algorithmic Assistance with Recommendation-Dependent PreferencesBryce McLaughlin, Jann Spiess. 991 [doi]
• Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized SystemsEvan Munro, David Jones, Jennifer Brennan, Roland Nelet, Vahab Mirrokni, Jean Pouget-Abadie. 992-1016 [doi]
• A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof MechanismsLea Nagel, Roberto Saitto. 1017 [doi]
• Incentives for Exploration at Market EquilibriumEren Ozbay, Vijay Kamble. 1018 [doi]
• Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the PoorMallesh Pai, Philipp Strack. 1019 [doi]
• Agreements of Continuous-Time GamesMikhail Panov. 1020-1044 [doi]
• The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed PointsChristos H. Papadimitriou, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Manolis Zampetakis. 1045 [doi]
• Reputation Effects under Short MemoriesHarry Pei. 1046 [doi]
• Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to ChaosGeorgios Piliouras, Fang-Yi Yu. 1047-1074 [doi]
• Pollution Permits: Efficiency by DesignMarek Pycia, Kyle Woodward. 1075 [doi]
• Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and ComputationKiran Rokade, Francesca Parise. 1076 [doi]
• Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided MatchingJoseph Root, Sophie Bade. 1077 [doi]
• A Nonparametric Approach with Marginals for Modeling Consumer ChoiceYanqiu Ruan, Xiaobo Li 0002, Karthyek Murthy, Karthik Natarajan. 1078 [doi]
• Axioms for Constant Function Market MakersJan Christoph Schlegel, Mateusz Kwasnicki, Akaki Mamageishvili. 1079 [doi]
• Combinatorial Inference on the Optimal Assortment in the Multinomial Logit ModelShuting Shen, Xi Chen, Ethan X. Fang, Junwei Lu. 1080 [doi]
• Delegating to Multiple AgentsSuho Shin, Keivan Rezaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi. 1081-1126 [doi]
• Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain PreferencesJamie Tucker-Foltz, Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1127 [doi]
• Adwords with Unknown Budgets and BeyondRajan Udwani. 1128 [doi]
• A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank ValuationsVignesh Viswanathan, Yair Zick. 1129-1152 [doi]
• Modeling and Correcting Bias in Sequential EvaluationJingyan Wang 0001, Ashwin Pananjady. 1153 [doi]
• Regret and Information AvoidanceZichang Wang. 1154 [doi]
• Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible ChoresXiaowei Wu 0001, Cong Zhang, Shengwei Zhou 0002. 1155 [doi]
• The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large ElectionsLirong Xia. 1156 [doi]
• Information Design of a Delegated SearchYangge Xiao, ZhenYu Hu, Shouqiang Wang. 1157 [doi]
• Extreme Points and First-Order Stochastic Dominance: Theory and ApplicationsKai-Hao Yang, Alexander Zentefis. 1158 [doi]
• Help and Haggle: Social Commerce Through Randomized, All-or-Nothing DiscountsLuyi Yang, Chen Jin, Zhen Shao. 1159 [doi]
• Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical EvidenceZikun Ye, Zhiqi Zhang, Dennis J. Zhang, Heng Zhang, Renyu Zhang. 1160 [doi]
• Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form CorrelationHanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng 0002, Vincent Conitzer. 1161-1186 [doi]
• Withholding Verifiable InformationKun Zhang. 1187 [doi]
• The Sample Complexity of Online Contract DesignBanghua Zhu, Stephen Bates, Zhuoran Yang, Yixin Wang, Jiantao Jiao, Michael I. Jordan. 1188 [doi]